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Abstract 
Czech Republic is considered to be the biggest Eurosceptic among the Central and Eastern 
European countries. On the contrary, Slovakia is known for the strongest support of the EU and 
European integration in the region in general. The paper analyses different reasons and drivers 
for Czech Euroscepticism and Slovak Euro-optimism, since these two countries belonged to one 
state twenty years ago. I use primary and secondary literature in the original languages in order 
to give more credibility to discussed issue. The research is focused mostly on the national 
political development after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and during the accession process in 
the 1990´s.  Also, case studies in the investigated period were ruled only by limited number of 
political parties, so I examine those parties’ electoral programmes and steps taken with regards to 
the European Union. Subsequently, states’ essential concerns and reservations towards the Union 
are classified, as well as the theoretical framework for such behaviour is provided. Finally, 
general comparison between Slovakia and Czech Republic is made in order to explain 
contrasting attitudes towards the EU as the governance on supranational level. 
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Project Design: 
Problem Area: 
When Czechoslovakia split into two sovereign states (the Slovak Republic and Czech Republic) 
in 1993, Czech standard of living ranged at 77 per cent of European average, while Slovaks 
started their independence with only 47 per cent of average European levels. (Eurostat, 1995)    
Within next twenty years, both Central European countries joined (as two individual states) the 
United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), what confirmed that both 
countries are reliable and respected economic partners in the region. But above all, they 
completed accession negotiations to the European Union together in 2002 and became official 
members in 2004.                                                                                   
With regards to uneven conditions with which Slovakia had to struggle after split, it is interesting 
to see how this country boosted its economy, implemented reforms in almost all aspects of public 
sphere and managed to achieve 73 per cent of European average living standards, while Czech 
Republic increased only by three per cent! (Luppova, 2012) Besides, according to the poll 
conducted in 2003 in Visegrad Group countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech 
Republic), only 51,1 per cent of Czechs supported accession to the EU (which was by that time 
around 20 per cent in average less than the rest of the Group), contrasting with astounding 92,5 
per cent of EU supporters in Slovakia! (Central European Opinion Research Group, 2003) 
Moreover, even though Slovakia was invited to enter the negotiations two years after its western 
neighbour, they completed negotiation chapters simultaneously, which was made possible also 
by positive standpoint towards European integration among national political elites. (SITA, 
2009) Czechs were more focused on global level of economic co-operation, such as membership 
in OECD, rather than regional integration. In fact, former Czech Prime Minister Klaus referred 
to the European Union as to “overregulated and inefficient”. (Szczerbiak, Taggart; 2010: p. 245) 
Bearing in mind these two characteristics, we would like to analyse the roots, reasons and 
evolution of euroscepticism in Czech Republic and compare it to euro optimistic Slovakia. We 
would like to find out why two countries sharing their history and culture, have maintained 
different attitudes towards the European Union since their split in 1993. For that matter, we 
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would like to compare Slovak and Czech Republic political situation while negotiating the 
accession to the EU, provide different reasons why they did so, and thus explain Czech 
euroscepticism and Slovak euro optimism ever since. 
 
Problem Formulation: 
How did the different approaches towards the EU originate and evolve in the politically 
and culturally similar countries? (Case study of Slovakia and Czech Republic) 
 
Partial research questions: 
1. Why did Czech Republic become euro sceptic and Slovakia euro optimist after 
Czechoslovakia split?  
2. How does euroscepticism and euro optimism influence national political behaviour 
within the EU?  
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1 Methodology 
The main purpose of this thesis is to explain the contradictory situation that can be 
observed in Slovakia and in Czech Republic. The two countries that in 1918 formed 
Czechoslovakia and functioned for 74 years together, went different directions after the 
dissolution. While during the 90’s Czech Republic has been showing low levels of the EU 
support (around 50-60%), Slovakia was quite the opposite (long-term around 90%).  I consider it 
very interesting example for further research - why it occurred and what was the driving element.  
At first, in order to better understand the research area, I conducted the literature review. I 
interpreted definitions and typologies of Euroscepticism from respected authors in the field and 
provided critical revision of their suggestions. By examining the existing theory on the 
phenomenon, I managed to create certain theoretical framework about the event from 
geographical as well as ideological perspective. Providing different approaches in the theoretical 
framework, the reader can understand, how broad and vast the current knowledge about the 
Euroscepticism is. Therefore it is easier to understand, why Euroscepticism occur and which 
pillars it is based on. Also, since my attempt is to explain the roots and evolution of 
Euroscepticism, I included different types of this phenomenon. Leconte’s four-class typology 
provides sufficient reasoning for Euroscepticism to occur and what are the assumptions. 
To summarize, the second chapter provides chosen theoretical framework and interprets 
categorizations of Euroscepticism from three different authors (more accurately pairs of authors). 
As for Taggart and Szczerbiak, that is the most fundamental concept and it gives the basis for the 
others’ suggestions. Explaining their observations, the reader can better understand further 
analysis. Second theoretical framework represents arguments brought up by Mudde and 
Kopecky. Although they are to some extent contradictory with the first classification, I consider 
their reservations important in order to explain chosen typology published by Conti and 
Verzichelli, as their work is the compromise between first two concepts. Also, the term 
Euroscepticism has various reasons for occurrence, so it is necessary to identify specific 
justification. In this manner, I introduce further Leconte’s reasoning, which contains of Political, 
Utilitarian, Value-based Euroscepticism and Cultural anti-Europeanism. Each category carries 
also specific concerns, which political leaders support their reservations with.  
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In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to adopt the theory that could 
explain the case study’s behaviour and its incentives. The Rational Choice Theory gives rationale 
to national political actors and their attitude. Also, it provides the reader with explanation why 
the actor set the goals and how the actor defends the interests. Add to this, I introduce the 
Rational Choice Theory to provide better explanations for political leaders’ behaviour. By 
following their national interests and advocate them on the supranational level, they create 
individual approach towards the European Union, so Euroscepticism thus varies. The Rational 
Choice Theory gives the reader useful background information together with specific indicators, 
based on which it is able to observe this theory in reality. In this context it is crucial to recognize 
how the national political scene can influence country’s direction based on specific state interests 
and strategies.  
Building upon the previous chapters, the empirical part analyzes the Czech and Slovak 
political development from 1993 until 2002, mapping the accession process and identifying 
reasons for Czech Eurosceptic and Slovak Euro-optimistic stand points. By investigating 
political parties’ pre-electoral programmes, principles and mutual differences, I attempt to 
explain why it is so that two countries with similar language, culture and political history can be 
that diverse in terms of the European Union’s perception. Also, I diagnose discrepant types of 
Euroscepticism based on Leconte’s classification by assigning these reasons to each analyzed 
political party. As a result, I design comprehensive tables including all investigated political 
actors, providing readers with a summary of national political attitudes and thus atmosphere 
created by them in the country. Finally, I interpret short comparison of Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, where I conclude my observations.   
 
1.1 Choice of countries 
When choosing the countries for the comparative analysis in political terms, I have had 
the following deliberations.  
Since my goal is to compare specific phenomenon such Euroscepticism, case studies 
should be countries with similar political background in order to researcher being able to conduct 
a comparison. Slovakia and Czech Republic creates contrasting examples, when being 
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counterparts with regards to attitude towards the European Union. Czech Republic together with 
United Kingdom belongs to the most Eurosceptic countries in the EU. Czech political leaders 
express their scepticism very often in media, Czech Republic was also the last country to sign the 
Lisbon Treaty and Czech Republic said no to the Constitutional Treaty and the European 
citizenship.  
On the other hand, Slovakia shows surprising turnover. After difficulties while building a 
democracy after the Czechoslovak dissolution in 1993, after exclusion from first round 
negotiations in the EU accession process because of democratic failure, and after one-party 
governance in period 1993-1998, Slovak Republic was able to boost their economy, improve 
national political situation and reach other Central and Eastern European countries in the 
negotiation process. As a result, Slovakia entered the EU together with Czech Republic in 2004, 
with long-term support for the EU membership around 90%.  
These two contrasting countries represents very interesting field of research from the 
political perspective. Also, since I speak both Czech and Slovak language, it is possible for me to 
conduct comprehensive research using the literature, primary and secondary sources in the 
original languages. 
 
1.2 Limitations 
As stated before, research on Euroscepticism is a vast and broad area. Since I am limited 
by the extent of master thesis, it is not possible to cover all aspects encompassing the 
phenomenon. Also, from the time perspective, I decided to cover the period after the 
Czechoslovak dissolution in 1993, mapping the EU accession process and finally end the 
research in 2002, before the two countries entered the EU. Situation after the accession is also 
worth of further research, namely the level of Euroscepticism in Czech Republic and Slovakia as 
the EU Member States. However, breadth of master thesis does not allow going deeper and 
conducting the research paper on such a broad issue in such a long period of time.   
Also, level of media freedom was at that time restricted to considerable extent. Therefore 
it was challenging to find relevant information published by credible source. Add to this, writing 
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about political elites and their attitude towards the European Union brings some difficulties in 
terms of primary data. Even though the politicians spoke sceptically about the supranational 
governance, the political parties, which they represented, did not publish any sceptical stances in 
the official party documents.  
 
2 Literature review 
In order to provide readers with all aspects relevant for this thesis´ topic, it is reasonable 
to start with a literature review, thus what have been written about Euroscepticism (both in 
negative and positive way) so far. It gives the reader a solid background for further chapters in 
the paper, where are adopted particular definitions and theories that most likely fit to chosen case 
studies. 
To start from the very beginning, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) 
expression ‘sceptic’ means “a person inclined to question or doubt accepted opinions”.1 The 
term ‘Euroscepticism’ entered the British political and journalistic lexicon in the middle of the 
1980s, so from a historical point of view it is rather recent. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defined a eurosceptic as “a person having doubts or reservations regarding the supposed 
benefits of increasing cooperation between the member states of the European Union”.2 
However, French dictionaries comprised the word ‘Eurocrat’ with similar explanation already in 
1960´s.3 Nowadays OED refers to a “person who is opposed to increasing the powers of the 
European Union”.4 
The term was officially printed for the very first time in The Times article (1985) about 
the common market, where the author used Eurosceptics and “the anti-marketeers” as the same 
meaning (accrediting the Labour Party).
5
 Furthermore, former Prime minister of the United 
                                                     
1
 The Oxford English Dictionary, online, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/sceptic (accessed  
    
April 22, 2013) 
2
 The Oxford English Dictionary, online,  
    
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/269632?redirectedFrom=eurosceptic#eid (accessed April 22, 2013) 
3
 Cécile Leconte, “Understanding Euroscepticism”, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3 
4
 Ibid, (OED) 
5
 Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, “Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European political debate,”  
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Kingdom Margaret Thatcher propagated this word among the public in her famous ‘Bruges 
speech’, delivered at the College of Europe in 1988. C. Leconte views it as “a key building block 
in the development of British opposition to the European Union”6, while Baker et al. phrase it as 
“Mrs Thatcher´s anti-European integration sentiments (...) was the first of this new epoch”.7 In 
short, first Eurosceptical signs started to emerge in Great Britain, therefore in my opinion, 
Harmsen and Spiering correctly concluded that “Euroscepticism initially appeared as a 
distinctively English phenomenon, further contributing to a sense of the country´s ‘awkwardness’ 
or ‘otherness’ in relation to Continental European project of political and economic 
integration.”8 Disputes among the member states during the Maastricht Treaty ratification 
process ‘helped’ to spread the phenomenon to the Continental Europe, where “it became a catch-
all synonym for any form of opposition or reluctance towards the EU”. 9 
First impulse to conceptualise the Euroscepticism as a not just British matter came from 
Paul Taggart, who in 1998 published an article in the European Journal of Political Research 
about euro-sceptical standing point of political parties within the western EU member states.
10
 
The author underlines an interesting fact that these anti-European ideas are mostly coming from 
the original six signatories of the Treaty of Rome, who are simultaneously the strongest drivers 
of the European integration in general. Moreover, he suggests not to examine deeper the impact 
of national policies on the European Union´s politics and decision-making, but analyze member 
states´ domestic behaviour instead. As a compelling reason the author considers the lack of 
interconnection between public opinion and national political parties´ strategy towards the 
European integration. Assumption that one builds on the other is according to Taggart an attempt 
to “downplay”.11   
                                                                                                                                                                           
   
European Studies, 20 (2004): 13-35  
6
 Cécile Leconte, “Understanding Euroscepticism”, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3 
7
 David Baker et al., “Euroscepticism in the British Party System: A Source of Fascination, Perplexity, and  
    
sometimes Frustration”, (Oxford: University Press, 2010), 98 
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  Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, “Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European political debate,”  
 
   European Studies, 20 (2004): 13  
9
  Cécile Leconte, “Understanding Euroscepticism”, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 4 
10
 Paul Taggart, “A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party  
     
systems,” European Journal of Political Research 33 (1998): 363-388 
11
 Ibid, 364 
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I agree with author that in order to explain this phenomenon, it is not sufficient to 
evaluate just the impact of individual member state on the EU political outcomes via 
intergovernmental game. Because with regards to Euroscepticism, states mostly express their 
sceptical attitudes towards particular policies that could directly affect them and therein 
somehow fit into categories of Eurosceptical countries. On the contrary, the domestic situation, 
composition of national political system and its own way of behaviour say more about the origin, 
type and progress of Euroscepticism within the state. In fact, that could be also an elucidation 
why Eurosceptical attitudes occurred in such an extent in the Czech Republic, while Slovakia 
persisted Euro-optimist. Therefore for the objective of this paper is also relevant to review the 
literature published not only in the field of theorising Euroscepticism, but also party-based 
Euroscepticism, as well as sceptical standing points in the Central and Eastern European political 
systems. 
Besides the debate about party-based cross-countries Euroscepticism, Taggart aspires to 
provide his own definition of that matter, when claiming that Euroscepticism “expresses the idea 
of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified 
opposition to the process of European integration”. 12 
He divides reasons for being eurosceptical into three categories.  
“Firstly, there is the anti-integration position of those who oppose the very idea of European 
integration and as a consequence oppose the EU. Secondly, there are those that are not in 
principle opposed to European integration but are sceptical that the EU is the best form of 
integration because it is too inclusive. Finally, there are those that are not in principle opposed 
to European integration but are sceptical that the EU is the best form of integration because it is 
too exclusive.” 13  
What I consider the most important, a distinction between softer and harder eurosceptical 
attitude towards the EU is mentioned here for the first time, which thenceforward forms two 
main classifications of the term Euroscepticism.
14
 Even though Taggart does not mention the 
Eastern and Central European countries, since those were not part of the EU in the time of 
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 Paul Taggart, “A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party  
     
systems,” European Journal of Political Research 33 (1998): 366 
13
 Ibid, 365-366 
14
 Ibid, 367 
13 
publishing the article, he claims that “institutional context is vital for understanding 
Euroscepticism”.15 That includes background of national party systems as well as nature of 
European integration process.  
I identify myself with his statement, so the thesis design is divided into part about Slovak 
and Czech accession process to the EU, and another part is addressed to the standing point of the 
most influential political parties in both countries.   
With regards to the first part, the clear direction of institutional development within the 
EU, or alternatively the general process of European integration, “allows different political 
forces to use scepticism about the same institution from different ideological perspectives”. 16 
Based on this argument, national parties can influence internal processes according to their 
ideologies in different ways. As an example I would mention two Czech political parties – the 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, and the Civic Democratic Party - who criticised the 
European Parliament for different reasons. While Communists condemn the EP for deepening of 
social differences (disappearance of middle class) based on neo-liberal direction of the EU
17
, 
Civic Democrats accuse this institution from wasting financial resources used for the 
Parliament´s “self-promotion campaigns and information offices within the Union”18 when the 
Member States are struggling in the EU crisis. 
Subsequent to Taggart above-mentioned interesting findings, Taggart joined Szczerbiak 
and together they formulated even more specific paper on the Euroscepticism
19
. Summarizing all 
previous work in the field, the two published the book Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party 
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 Ibid, 385 
16
 Paul Taggart, “A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party  
     
systems,” European Journal of Political Research 33 (1998): 385 
17
 Official website of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, 
    http://www.kscm.cz/volby-a-akce/volby-do- ep-2009/volebni-program (accessed August 1st, 2013) 
18
 Official website of the European department of the Civic Democratic Party, “Europoslanci ODS: Místo  
    vydíraní členských států musí Evropský parlament začít šetřit”, 
    http://odseu.eu/clanek/europoslanci-ods-misto-vydirani-clenskych-statu-musi-evropsky-parlament-zacit-
setrit  (accessed August 1st, 2013) 
19
 Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, “Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union,  
    the Euro and
 
Europeanization”, Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No. 1 (University  
    of Sussex, 2000) 
14 
Politics of Euroscepticism (2010). Although the term ‘Euroscepticism’ was used before, only 
Taggart and Szczerbiak provided solid theoretical definitions and extensive typology of what and 
how can be observed this phenomenon primarily within the European Union. Moreover, this 
book is not only current summary of the rich bibliography that Szczerbiak and Taggart published 
within the topic from 1998, but also comparison with other authors´ findings and answer to 
partial criticism the two were facing from fellow scholars. 
Before analysing their observations further, it is worth to mention the Opposing Europe 
Research Network (OERN), a “network of scholars sharing common interests in researching the 
comparative party politics of Euroscepticism” 20 launched in 2000 by the Sussex European 
Institute in United Kingdom and led namely by Szczerbiak and Taggart. It was renamed to the 
European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN) three years later. Scholars in the 
new initiative expanded their occupation to “researching the impact of European integration on 
parties, elections and public opinion”.21 Their research papers and ongoing studies are valuable 
source for both the theoretical and the analysis chapters, therefore we interpret them in this 
chapter later on. 
As already mentioned before, Szczerbiak and Taggart published a very comprehensive 
book providing wide and deep interpretation of Euroscepticism, the public form as well as the 
party-based form. Despite the fact, that Taggart and Szczerbiak´s previous working papers 
focused mostly on United Kingdom or the Western European countries, after the Eastern and 
Central European countries joined the European Union, local Eurosceptics adopted the Western 
model of party-based Euroscepticism, so generally speaking the typology that Szczerbiak and 
Taggart suggested is now applicable to all member states.  
Most of the other scholars active in the field developed their ideas build on the EPERN 
leaders´ fundamentals. However, in their book Opposing Europe (2010) the authors criticise one 
thing from the very beginning. Even though the euro-sceptical (but also euro-optimist) literature 
                                                     
20
 The University of Sussex, website,  
    http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/research/europeanpartieselectionsreferendumsnetwork (accessed April  
    19th, 2013) 
21
 The University of Sussex,  
     
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/research/europeanpartieselectionsreferendumsnetwork (accessed April  
   19th, 2013) 
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enjoys ‘flurry of research’, at the same time it focuses mostly on case studies, while theoretical 
parts are transposed from one paper to another. Also, there is not much comparative work within 
the field of Euroscepticism in the EU. Moreover, definitions remains without alteration. 
22
   
One of the most significant contributions, that can help to clear the picture in the 
Euroscepticism categorization, is considered a book written by Cécile Leconte, Understanding 
Euroscepticism (2010). In the book, Leconte at first explains the basic terms and the extent of 
influence that Euroscepticism generates onto EU's institutions. Moreover, the author does not 
restrict herself only for descriptions, but she also provides her own analysis and poses open 
questions. Leconte continues with diverse varieties of Euroscepticism, among which we identify 
the most applicable types for our case studies, Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
What counts in the terms of Euroscepticism is, according to Leconte, reasoning given by 
each actor why to behave Eurosceptically. As the author argues, Euroscepticism is not matter 
only of non-mainstream actors or “ignorant voters” trying to “sanction national governments”, 
but also mainstream concern where political leaders, the quality press and other public 
institutions play crucial role.
23
 In my opinion, Czech Republic is clear example of this 
‘mainstream Euroscepticism’. 
Additionally, Leconte provides the reader with main reasons why it is important not to 
overlook such as spreading phenomena as Euroscepticism nowadays is. She identifies three main 
reasons for Euroscepticism: 
1. the European Community was established as a forum for expressing different points of 
view among states, but nowadays it is mostly about pooling sovereignty 
2. there are quests driven by Eurosceptics for the EU to become mere free trade area, which 
would cause, according to the author, bigger problems on global level 
3. finally, there is significant connection between democracy and legitimacy at the EU level 
24
 
 To make short conclusion, most of the concerns are related to political dimension of the 
EU and the associated implications. In case of political union, there is a doubt about persisting 
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 Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, “Opposing Europe? : The comparative Party Politics of  
      
Euroscepticism,” (Oxford: University Press, 2010), 3-7 
23
 Cécile Leconte, “Understanding Euroscepticism”, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 9 
24
 Ibid, 13 
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democratic but reasonable at the same time. Fundamental interests of states vary and therefore 
countries are reticent as regards multinational governance. The term Euroscepticism is viewed 
very inflexible. In my opinion, it is wrong assumption to see Eurosceptics ‘black-or-white’. 
Definitions and classifications can be combined to some extent and still reflect actual status (e.g. 
Szczerbiak/Taggart hard and soft Euroscepticism with Conti positive support for European 
integration in the theory chapter). 
As Leconte further concludes, European Eurosceptic groups have only limited influence 
on the EU decision-making and that is for two main reasons: firstly, they are supported by only 
one-fifth of registered voters; secondly, most of the EU work is prepared by personnel active on 
European level so they are “relatively immune to the turmoil of domestic parties”.25 Accordingly, 
“Eurosceptics’ main channels of influence in the EU are national governments”26, where 
Eurosceptics can use four possible instruments to express their concerns: referendums on the 
national level, “rotating EU-presidency, voting systems in the Council and provision on treaty 
reforms”27 on the supranational level. 
For that matter, Leconte identifies three factors that can influence state activity as a 
rotating EU-president. Firstly, Commission has a monopoly on legislative administration, so EU-
presidency provides only little room for country to influence the EU's agenda in significant 
magnitude. Secondly, “peer pressure” together with “the wish to have successful presidency”28 
can discourage individual state from taking action from the Eurosceptic perspective. Moreover, 
other national delegations and EU institutions “have to be taken into account by the presidency 
when it tries to broker deals”29. 
As an example Leconte considers Czech presidency in 2009, when peer pressure and 
‘path-dependency’ influenced national government not to push through their Eurosceptic 
agendas (especially when the main coalition party ODS was significantly Eurosceptic). More 
interestingly, Czech Republic landed into paradoxical situation, when while their presidency they 
had to negotiate ratification of the Lisbon Treaty with Irish government. This included reversion 
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 Cécile Leconte, “Understanding Euroscepticism”, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 14-15 
26
 Ibid, 15 
27
 Ibid, 15-16 
28
 Ibid, 17 
29
 Ibid, 17 
17 
of collective opinion of Irish voters (who voted ‘no’ in the first referendum) by country, whose 
president used all possible means (including Czech Constitutional Court) to block the ratification 
of the same Treaty! Ultimately, Czech Republic managed to negotiate second Irish referendum 
followed by ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland.
30
 Anyhow, it took Czech president 
Vaclav Klaus nine months (after the Constitutional Court confirmed that the document is in 
accordance with the Constitution) to sign the Lisbon Treaty. Czech Republic was the last country 
to ratify the agreement and according to Klaus, by signing the Treaty Czech Republic “ceased to 
be a sovereign state anymore”.31 Despite the Eurosceptic position, peer pressure proved to be 
more influential in terms of intergovernmental matter. 
Valuable for our research is chapter dedicated to different origins of Euroscepticism 
across the European Union member states (geographical aspect) together with its changes over 
the time (chronological aspect). Leconte sorts European countries into three ’ideal-typical 
categories’ in order to illustrate different kinds of Euroscepticism across these countries. First 
group shows 60-80% support for European membership represented by Benelux countries, 
Spain, Denmark or Romania. Second group is counterpart with less than 40% of support (United 
Kingdom, Austria, Hungary). Third group is somewhere in between with around 50% of 
membership supportive citizens (Germany, France).
32
 In case of Slovakia, it would be by all 
means in first group while Czech Republic would be sorted in the second group.  
Chronologically, one can distinguish between two main periods in the terms of European 
integration: from 1950s to the mid-1980s; and from 1986 (signature of the Single European Act) 
onwards. The second mentioned period is paradoxical in some way. European integration 
widened and deepened significantly since the end of 1980s, but also Euroscepticism (starting 
with Bruges speech in 1988) became more substantial issue within European countries. 
Controversies around ratification of the Maastricht Treaty just affirmed disunity among Member 
states.
33
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As for accession process, it plays important role in the terms of public Euroscepticism, as 
well as party-based Euroscepticism in candidate country. Relevant is also linkage between 
accession process and democratic transition. Namely in the case of the eastern and central 
European countries (ECE), where accession was about the same length as in other Member 
states, but consolidation of democracy counted to almost fifteen years. Besides, ECE countries 
had to struggle with “more or less radical process of economic transition, with big redistributive 
consequences”.34 Therefore case studies of Czech Republic and Slovakia form interesting sample 
full of contradictory attitudes and national political atmosphere. As Leconte explains, “once EU 
accession is perceived as granted, it becomes less valued and critical voices about the EU are 
more likely to be raised”35. Accordingly Czech Republic, as a country in the centre of Europe, 
considered membership in the EU as a belated return to Europe and was not reluctant to express 
their concerns about it. On the other hand, Slovakia “had been jeopardized by the anti-
democratic tendencies of the Meciar government”36, so support for the EU membership was 
highest among all accession countries (around 92%).
37
 One more reason can be inferred from 
observation above - if citizens are not satisfied with the performance of national institutions, they 
more likely to recourse towards European ones.
38
  
Yves Meny from European University Institute in Florence accredited Understanding 
Euroscepticism as a ‘worthwhile experience’. However, the reader might be confused with the 
definition of Euroscepticism, because it is hard to separate Euroscepticism from fair criticism. 
According to Meny, Leconte addresses mostly well-known issues such as legitimacy and 
democracy deficit from the Eurosceptical perspective, but fails in the terms of distinction 
between sociological and political Euroscepticism. Anyhow, Leconte successfully encompasses 
vast phenomenon in a compact text with clear structure and pertinent observations.
39
 
Party-based Euroscepticism can be considered as much more explored area than 
theoretical approaches of Euroscepticism itself. One of the articles that Taggart and Szczerbiak 
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consider “the most comprehensive alternative conceptualisation” 40 is The Two Sides of 
Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe written by Petr 
Kopecký and Cas Mudde (2002). In the paper, the authors acknowledge influential theoretical 
elaboration of EPERN leaders (Taggart, Szczerbiak) and also comprehend their re-definition of 
the term ‘Euroscepticism’ by taking into account different forms (‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism) that emerged in the East Central Europe.
41
 
 However, Kopecký and Mudde (2002) recognize four major weaknesses in this 
elaboration. First, they view definition of soft Euroscepticism very broad and unspecific, which 
can encompass “every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU”42. Kopecký and Mudde 
are also critical towards the description of soft and hard Euroscepticism, mainly because of 
confusion recalled by the authors themselves. After clear definition of these terms they claim that 
“in practice hard Euroscepticism can be identified by the principled objections to the current 
form of European integration in the EU”43 what makes the previous interpretation distorted. 
Moreover, while trying to differentiate the two main classifications, Taggart and Szczerbiak use 
the same criteria as for correlating soft and hard Euroscepticism. Mudde and Kopecký criticise 
this way of explanation, because then the linkage and the distinction merge into one unclear 
interpretation, which is not beneficial for the reader to determine why Euroscepticism occurs. 
Finally, Mudde and Kopecký appreciate the effort that Taggart and Szczerbiak made to explain 
different reasons for Euroscepticism - scepticism towards the European integration (‘principled’ 
opposition) and scepticism towards the current version of the European Union (‘contingent’ 
opposition) - and for Euro optimism (based on Easton´s A Framework for political analysis44) - 
‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support for European integration.45 
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Mudde and Kopecký reproach the lack of deep analysis necessary for unambiguous 
characterization the two different perspectives of the Euroscepticism. Consequently, in the paper 
about party-based Euroscepticism are assigned to eurosceptical standing point anti-European 
parties as well as pro-European. That can cause a distortion not only in classification of 
Eurosceptical parties among the Member states, but also blur the strength of this phenomena in 
the region.
46
  
As a result of the critique, Kopecký and Mudde propose their own definition of party-
based Euroscepticism - four categories: Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptics and 
Eurorejects - which is further explained in the theory chapter. Again, Szczerbiak and Taggart 
view it as “the most comprehensive alternative conceptualisation”47, so I consider Kopecký and 
Mudde´s critique as an interesting counterpart to Taggart/Szczerbiak´s classification for the 
theory chapter.  
However, Taggart and Szczerbiak respond with their own reservations towards Mudde 
and Kopecký research paper. First of all, using the example of UK Independence Party, the 
authors state that apparently Eurosceptical political party would not be, according to Kopecký 
and Mudde categorisation, Eurosceptic anymore. That is caused notably because of neglecting 
the distinction between principled and contingent opposition towards the EU.
48
 
Secondly, Europragmatist description is quite illogical - supporting bigger EU 
sovereignty and current course of integration project, but at the same time opposing European 
integration in general. What is more, it can make some parties (e.g. the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia) even harder to categorise. Even though the Movement spelled out their 
interest in being the EU Member State, their behaviour caused Slovakia had been excluded from 
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the first round of negotiations on EU membership in 1997.
49
 Besides, Taggart and Szczerbiak are 
not aware of any political party within the EU that would fit to this category. 
50
  
Handily pointed by Taggart and Szczerbiak, even though Kopecký and Mudde focus their 
empirical research in four Central and East European EU (back then) candidate countries, “it is 
difficult to identify a party’s stance on either European integration through the EU principle or 
on the EU’s current trajectory because most of them do not articulate them, or simply have not 
even considered them.”51 Or, as in case of Slovakia, national elites confused the European region 
by behaving both pro and against European integration - this was mainly rooted in difficult and 
certainly not very democratic internal situation in 1990’s. 
Concurrently, Euroenthusiasts are “too inclusive and does not really capture the full 
range of different approaches to the EU that are encompassed within it”. Therefore Taggart and 
Szczerbiak suggest to break down this category with regards to the reason why is party in favour 
of European integration.
52
  
It is interesting to see, that while Taggart and Szczerbiak are criticised for being too 
exclusive, Mudde and Kopecký are blamed for being too inclusive. On top of that, both duos 
bring a charge against each other for “producing strange bedfellows” by allocating parties with 
different standing point into one class (their classes are moderately inconsistent).
53
 So it can be 
concluded that it is indeed difficult to define clear borders between each category and it is just 
upon the reader which classification should be taken into consideration and for what purpose. 
In addition to EPERN scholars, also Conti give his own point of view on Euroscepticism. 
Likewise others, he build his observations on Taggart and Szczerbiak´s typology, but add very 
practical element - positive perspective towards the European integration. His research paper 
‘Party attitudes to European integration: a longitudinal analysis of the Italian case’ (2003) was 
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at first meant only as a case study of Euroscepticism in Italy, but become very popular 
conceptualization of this phenomena ever since.
54
  
Since Conti focuses mostly on party position within the national political system (study 
case of Italy), he combines hard and soft Euroscepticism with Katz and Mair´s ‘cartel-party’ 
typology. In Katz and Mair’s Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the 
Emergence of the Cartel Party (1995), the authors claim that parties started first as ‘brokers’ 
between civil society and state, but it has changed over the time. As the main reason they argue 
that “there has been a tendency in recent years towards an ever closer symbiosis between parties 
and the state, and that this then sets the stage for the emergence of a new party type” which they 
identify as 'the cartel party'.
55
 This symbiosis occurs because party activity requires more and 
more finances (namely before elections), so parties are forced to search for financial support out 
of the group. Powerful parties with senior officials and lawmakers within their unit manage to 
receive state subventions. As a result, “the state, which is invaded by the parties, and the rules of 
which are determined by the parties, becomes a fount of resources through which these parties 
not only help to ensure their own survival, but through which they can also enhance their 
capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives. The state, in this sense, becomes 
an institutionalized structure of support, sustaining insiders while excluding outsiders.”56  
Subsequently, Katz and Mair identify ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ parties, what is considered 
to be a significant argument for (not) being Eurosceptic, since the political units on the periphery 
are often excluded from substantial decision-making.
57
 This conclusion I consider as a very good 
starting point for further explanation of party-based Euroscepticism, since it gives justification 
for parties’ behaviour within the national political system.  
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Taggart and Szczerbiak criticise this interpretation for being too austere, where left-right 
distinction does not play any role in the party position.
58
  They rather distinguish between core 
and peripheral policies of the EU as one of the drivers for party-based Eurosceptical standing 
point. Fully aware of possible misunderstanding (various EU countries are interested in various 
policies), the two claim that “one has to analyze the actors’ positions within their specific 
context”. 59 
As a response, Conti claims in his paper that there is certain validity in combination of 
left-right party position with core-peripheral distinction. He suggest to divide political parties 
into four sub-groups: 
A. Centre-left parties 
B. Centre-right parties 
C. Far-left parties 
D. Far-right parties
60
 
The author states that C and D would be in Taggart/Szczerbiak perspective Eurosceptical, 
but as proved the analysis of these sub-groups, one can find Eurosceptics also in groups A or B. 
As a result, it is possible to find some common ground between left-right/core-peripheral and 
mainstream/non-mainstream political parties.
61
  
As I suggested before, accepting one classification does not necessary mean to reject 
others. To some degree, it is possible to combine and therefore illustrate more accurate definition 
that fits better to my case studies. Besides, taking into account only left-right distinction would 
not be helpful for explanation why Euroscepticism occurs in certain countries in bigger intensity, 
since in my opinion it is also connected with historical and economic aspect, as well as with 
countries’ priorities on the national, as well as supranational level. As my case studies show, 
historical perspective is very important in order to explain the type of national Euroscepticism. 
After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the two countries have been going different directions, 
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having various concerns on their minds. Slovakia viewed the European Union as an alliance full 
of economic benefits, while Czech Republic considered it inefficient. Slovakia aspired for 
restoration of democracy, Czech Republic already transitioned to democratic political 
arrangement. Their priorities therefore expressed distinct interests towards the EU, but also 
towards the state itself – Czech Republic prefers intergovernmental game based on a dialogue of 
sovereign states, while Slovakia supports EU institutions and supranational governance.
62
 
63
 
Moving along in the literature review, a very interesting six-class party-position schema 
is provided by Christopher Flood and Simon Usherwood (who are according to Taggart and 
Szczerbiak deliberately avoiding the term Euroscepticism
64
). On the contrary, they suggest 
classifying six primary groups: 
a. rejectionists 
b. revisionist 
c. minimalist 
d. gradualist 
e. reformist 
f. maximalist65 
This is considered to be very comprehensive range starting from total rejection of any 
kind of integration to implicit advocacy of federal Europe. 
66
 Taggart and Szczerbiak consider it 
as very wide distinction since one political party can fit more than one group, thus it is hard to 
categorise them. Moreover, to apply this classification in real situation, a lot of data is required in 
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order to do so.  On the other hand they appreciate authors’ not too inclusive approach, which is 
more complex than other research papers within this issue. 
67
  
With regards to conceptual approaches towards party-based Euroscepticism, Taggart and 
Szczerbiak are clearly theoretical fathers of Euroscepticism. As stated above, most of the other 
scholars simply build on their fundamentals and bring some new perspectives or angles. After 
the two re-defined their previous paperwork, criticism from other experts in the field involves 
only minor things, which are also questionable. As a matter of fact, revised version is currently 
used for mass of the case studies published in the sphere of Euroscepticism.  
On the other hand, for the aim of this paper is valuable to encompass also Kopecký and 
Mudde findings since they focus, among others, on Slovakia and Czech Republic. Also few more 
scholars (Henderson, Kaniok, Havlík, Lewis, Rybář, Peltrám etc.) dedicate their work to the 
region of Central and Eastern Europe, which help me to illustrate the form and range of this 
phenomenon in Slovakia and Czech Republic.  
The European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN) scholar Karen 
Henderson dedicates her research namely on Slovak case of Euroscepticism, more precisely 
Euroscepticism until the end of Mečiar governance (until 1998), and Euro-optimism ever since. 
In her paper ‘EU Influence on Party Politics in Slovakia’ (2005), Henderson states that “Slovakia 
presents a rare case where the EU has led to party system change at national level” and its 
national elites’ behaviour was during the accession process full of confusion and paradoxes.68 
This interesting observation is further analysed in the empirical chapter.  
The author also calls for more qualification from Taggart and Szczerbiak, when they 
claim that Western European countries Euroscepticism would eventually occur also in Central 
and Eastern European countries once they join the EU club. On the contrary, by the time of 
accession period, Slovakia had small extremist parties in government which is in conflict with 
Taggart and Szczerbiak statement.
69
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Also Eva Lešková pursues her research within the field of Slovak party-based 
Euroscepticism. Her approach is mostly about public opinion in Slovakia towards European 
integration not only after joining the EU, but also before and during the accession process. As 
Lešková interestingly points out, being Eurosceptic in Slovakia in the late 90’s meant to be 
against vital interests of state itself. 
70
 
Otherwise the author does not provide any suggestions on her own, except descriptive 
chapter about individual party position within the Slovak political system. I include Henderson 
and Lešková papers into my thesis due to the authors’ different standing points, when Henderson 
is outside observer while Lešková gives a perspective from position of Slovak citizen.  
With regards to Euroscepticism in Czech Republic, the most comprehensive case study 
paper was published by Petr Kopecký and Peter Ucen (1998). They chronologically trace the 
development of political regimes in Slovakia and Czech Republic after their ‘divorce’. Worth of 
mentioning is a fact, that both countries viewed their split as another step towards faster and 
deeper European integration. As a proof of this statement the authors cited Jozef Moravčík, then 
Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs: “We do not carry out of transformation of Slovakia into 
independent state with intention of isolation. On the contrary, we do it in order to contribute to 
the process of international co-operation as a sovereign unit.”71 Moreover, they add the 
European dimension to the topic by saying that “the integration was technical rather than 
political problem”, because “the post-communist countries were also assured by their western 
European counterparts of the desirability and viability of EU enlargement”.72 As a result, after-
split Slovakia persisted in favour of federal mood, while Czech Republic started to express its 
first Eurosceptic attitudes regarding EU policies and institutional arrangements.
73
 Significant 
historical perspective given by Kopecký and Učeň is crucial point for explaining why Czech and 
Slovak Euroscepticism or Euro-optimism has occurred. Taking into account that both states had 
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Eurosceptic political parties in the time of their split, it is fascinating to look through the 
accession process what actually shaped their standing point.  
Add to this, Petr Kaniok and Vlastimil Havlík (scholars from Masaryk University, Czech 
Republic) published a book about Czech Euroscepticism as a public opinion. In the paper 
‘Euroscepticism: countries of the Central and Eastern Europe’ (2006), authors try to give some 
explanation why is it so, that Czech citizens incline more to being sceptical about European 
integration. As a reason they identify too many restrictions demanded from the EU member 
states during Czech accession process (closure of nuclear power station Temelin, labour mobility 
within the EU, pooling unreasonable extent of the sovereignty onto supranational level etc.). 
Even though Czechs supported the entry to the EU, they also felt pushed to make decisions they 
did not approve. Therefore there is a shift from viewing the EU as a forum for intergovernmental 
game to alliance with a lack of governmental leadership, where integration had already gone too 
far.
74
 Leconte explains that as for accession process, it can considerably shape national 
perceptions on the EU. If the process is too lengthy or too radical (e.g. in case of ECE countries 
where democracy was just building up and significant reforms were necessary), public opinion 
can shift very suddenly. Also, bad economic situation in the country with the burden of 
additional integration costs can lower public support for the EU membership.
75
 
Subsequently, they build on the work of Kopecky and Ucen, and take over the party-
based Euroscepticism research to add period 1998-2006. They include case studies of Visegrad 
group countries using Taggart and Szczerbiak revised theoretical framework. 
76
 
With regards to the successful research paper, this method assures me to use Taggart and 
Szczerbiak concept as well, even though Czech scholars consider Conti explanation more 
applicable. Since the aim of this paper is to compare Euroscepticism and Euro-optimism in two 
different countries, taking step back and adopt basic theory on which others build their 
observations, is in my eyes considered to be more accurate. Moreover, due to the fact that 
Slovakia and Czech Republic went different ways, elementary theory provides wider angle of 
possible interpretation of discussed issue, while more categorised concept can make it harder.  
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Anyhow, there is significant lack of comparative studies within the countries of Central 
and Eastern European region. Single case studies can be put abreast and simple deduction can be 
concluded, nevertheless only very few experts in the field attempted to do so. Although there is a 
gap in research, I find reviewed literature adequate to conduct a comparative research with 
chosen case studies on my own. 
 
3 Theory Chapter 
 
This chapter further describes and analyses theoretical framework I adopt for an 
explanation of Euroscepticism and its party-based form. Also, I do not follow only one particular 
definition, since a combination of three experts in the field gives more credibility and support for 
my case studies. Moreover, perspectives from which you can view this phenomenon vary, so it is 
helpful to involve other authors in order to clarify the position of Slovakia and Czech Republic 
on the issue. 
At first, I start with Leconte and her four types of Euroscepticism - utilitarian 
Euroscepticism, political Euroscepticism, value-based Euroscepticism and cultural anti-
Europeanism. These are basic reasons for country to be Eurosceptic, which provides readers with 
a wider angle of the phenomenon apart from party-based Euroscepticism. It is also helpful in 
terms of answering the questions: Why is Euroscepticism stronger in one country and weaker in 
the other one? And why are there different types of Euroscepticism? 
Furthermore, I interpret Taggart and Szczerbiak’s revised observations. The authors offer 
a clear and comprehensive terminology, which is a rectification of their previous work, criticised 
by Kopecky and Mudde. As a result, Kopecky and Mudde suggest their own classification of 
Euroscepticism (including also a positive perspective), what is considered to be a connection 
between Hard/Soft Euroscepticism definitions, and Conti and Vermicelli’s categorization. Last 
mentioned is the most popular definition among Czech and Slovak scholars, which reflects most 
accurately on the attitudes of political parties in both countries. In fact, it gives a chronological 
but also logical aspect to this chapter. 
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3.1 Varieties of Euroscepticism 
Before further analysis of chosen theories, it is useful to list the identified reasons for 
Euroscepticism. Leconte (2010) distinguishes between four main classes: utilitarian, political, 
value-based Euroscepticism and cultural anti-Europeanism.  
 
3.1.1 Utilitarian Euroscepticism  
This particular motive is investigating Euroscepticism from an economic perspective that 
is the costs and benefits of being a member. Leconte (2010) interprets this motive as a 
“scepticism about the gains derived from integration, or its distributional impacts”77. This 
statement is supported by previous research performed by other scholars (expected economic 
gains and losses through membership were already analyzed for instance by Anderson&Reichert, 
1996; Gabel, 1998; Hix, 2005).  
Anderson and Reichert published Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the 
E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis (1996), where the authors conducted a comprehensive study of 
public support for European integration based on aspects such as gender, occupation, income or 
age. Not surprisingly, they concluded that cross-national differences among the Member states in 
the terms of Euro-support or Euroscepticism “have been explained on a somewhat ad hoc basis 
with different national and international traditions, countries’ different positions in the 
international system, and length of EU membership”78 Stand point of the individual country can 
be influenced by two main instruments - direct (payments made by the EU Member states) and 
indirect (trade relations with other EU Member states) benefits.
79
 As a result, “different countries 
can be expected to be differentially successful at dealing with greater economic integration”.80  
In fact, empirical studies show also ‘utilitarian Euro-optimism’. For example, Spain 
considered economic benefits deriving from the membership as the main driver for joining  the 
EU.
81
 Within the period 1986-2006, Spain received from European funds total of 93,4 million 
                                                     
77
 Cécile Leconte, “Understanding Euroscepticism”, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 46 
78
 Christopher J. Anderson and M. Shawn Reichert, “Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in  
    the E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis”, Journal of Public Policy (1996), vol 15(3):231-249 
79
 Ibid, 233-234 
80
 Ibid, 233 
81
 Juan Díez Medrano, “Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the   
   United Kingdom”, Princeton University Press, (Princeton, 2003), 11  
30 
euros used for national economy transformation.
82
 Also, if the country performs well 
economically, citizens are more likely to support further integration, as was the case of 
Germany.
83
 
Leconte claims that utility of the EU was not in question until the beginning of 1990s, 
when the European Monetary Union (EMU) was introduced, and later when enlargement 
towards East took place. ”The cost of integration, calls for re-nationalization of the EU´s 
distributive policies, and backlashes of economic nationalism increasingly permeated domestic 
public debates as governing parties articulated a more blunt expression of national interests”.84 
Since the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries were less developed than their 
Western neighbours, these states had to introduce public spending cutbacks in order to emulate 
other Member States. Therefore the state remained the only provider of social welfare, which 
shaped public opinion about European integration in a negative way. Moreover, introducing 
common currency was associated with inflation and some countries felt disadvantaged after 
joining the EMU. As an example Leconte gives Germany, which strongly clung to Deutsche 
Mark and after adopting the Euro, they believed “that the national currency had been 
undervalued during the shift to the Euro - and thus was ‘sold’ too cheaply - contributed to the 
idea that the country as a whole did not benefit largely from European integration”85. On the 
other hand, in 2001 Ireland was criticised by the Commission for not following the Stability and 
Growth Pact (budgetary discipline), while Germany was not taken into account despite the same 
budgetary laxness. Therefore it gave an impression, that participating countries in EMU are not 
equally treated, what is considered to be another reason for utilitarian Euroscepticism.
86
  
Apart from these discrepancies regarding the introduction of common currency and the 
associated convergence criteria, utilitarian Euroscepticism was fully reflected during the 2004 
and 2007 enlargements.  Many mainstream political parties across the European Union (e.g. 
Forza Italia in Italy, People´s Party for Freedom and Democracy in Netherlands, or the Social 
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Democratic Party of Germany) were explicitly opposing to CEE countries’ inclusion into the 
European club. The biggest concerns were redistributive policies, such as Common Agricultural 
Policy or Common Fisheries Policy. The EU-15 viewed enlargement as an additional cost to 
their common budget, when in their eyes these developing countries could ‘swallow’ most of the 
funds earmarked for reinforcement of mentioned policies. Therefore calls for re-nationalization 
of certain policies (based on each state’s national interests) and ‘economic nationalism’ became 
one of the ways in which utilitarian Euroscepticism could be observed.
87
 All in all, liberalization 
of the EU market and weakening of national fiscal, monetary and labour policies generated more 
sceptical thoughts about the direction European integration.
88
 
 
3.1.2 Political Euroscepticism 
The second group of Eurosceptical states in Leconte’s classification is based on 
“principled opposition or defiance towards the setting up of a supranational institutional system, 
the delegation of powers to supranational institutions beyond a limited core of policies (...) and 
to the principle of the pooling of sovereignties.”89 Indications of political Euroscepticism 
encompass democratic, identity or sovereignty issues. The salient turning point was the 
Maastricht Treaty, when controversy around European citizenship turned countries like France, 
United Kingdom or Denmark to opposition. Fear of losing their own national identity and 
possible divergence between European and national citizenship forced Denmark to claim that 
“citizenship of the Union is a political and legal concept which is entirely different from national 
citizenship” and that was also the cause for failure of the first Danish referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty.
90
 For that matter, while making a speech in the House of Lords in 1993, 
Margaret Thatcher criticised this ‘double allegiance’ by comparing national versus European 
citizenship and their mutual weight. Add to this, “the Maastricht Treaty gives this new European 
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Union all the attributes of a sovereign state”.91 At the same time, France expressed concerns 
about elections to the European Parliament since the electoral system in France is different from, 
for example, the German one. The debate led to rejection of the European citizenship not only by 
French peripheral, but also mainstream political parties such as the Rally for the Republic 
(fr.Rassemblement pour la république).92 
In fact, the United Kingdom is characterized by the lowest long-term levels of public 
support towards the European project. First of all, British population carries a strong identity 
resulting from a rich national history, which is at stake because of European integration. This is 
greatly connected to the fear of losing sovereignty, since Great Britain is a world economic 
power and strong player in the field of world politics.
93
 Disputes about identity started to be 
noticeable already in the end of 1980s, when during the Bruges Speech in 1988 Margaret 
Thatcher stated: “Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as 
Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its customs, traditions and identity”.94 Bear in mind that 
there were Eurosceptical speeches long before M. Thatcher (W. Churchill, in 1950s), but Bruges 
Speech is considered to be a critics of the modern EU.
95
 
Anderson and Reichert (1996) explain that politicians who helped to create the European 
Union experienced military conflict in the heart of Europe, so they carried clear concept of 
national identity and had no doubts about the benefits resulting from the Union, although these 
did not include European citizenship. As a result, they were more committed to keep their 
national citizenship than younger generations who did not have ‘an equivalent historical 
reference’.96  
As mentioned before, identity and sovereignty are firmly interconnected. Sovereignty can 
be defined as ‘the ability of the nation to exercise independent political power on the given 
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territory’ or ‘supremacy of authority or rule as exercised by a sovereign or sovereign state’97.  
Do the Member states still have supremacy over their own territory when they had to adjust their 
legislation and regulations to the European Union ones? 
A customary Eurosceptic objection against European integration is loss of sovereignty in 
favour of another Member states. On the contrary, supporters of European integration claim that 
pooling sovereignty means both gains and losses, since the state can acquire greater influence 
within the region by co-operating with other Member states.
98
 Anyhow, there is to some extent 
deprivation of sovereignty in key spheres such as monetary or fiscal policies and that is for some 
national political actors sufficient reason for opposing either the Union, or integration in general.  
Additionally, sovereignty is closely connected to democracy, or in Eurosceptic terms, the 
deficit of democracy. National parliaments were fighting with difficulties already during 1980s 
and 1990s, mainly due to the constitutional differences among the Member states.
99
 For instance, 
United Kingdom experienced a new wave of Eurosceptical discourse at that time. It was not just 
legislative processes, but also the fact that some of the European institutions were filled with 
non-elected personnel that drove the British Eurosceptic stance. Words such as ‘unelected 
bureaucracy’, ‘European super-state’ and ‘Brussels dictatorship’ became among citizens new 
synonyms for the European Union.
100
  
Follesdal and Hix (2005) identified five major reasons why the Union is criticised for democratic 
deficits. First of all, the European executive gains more power at the expense of national 
governments, so “these executive agents at the European level are beyond the control of national 
parliaments“101. Since “the design of the EU means that policy-making at the European level is 
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dominated by executive actors”102, the Member states encounter an internal form of political 
Euroscepticism.
103
 Secondly, in comparison with the Council or the Commission, the European 
Parliament is considered to be the weakest one. “Although the European Parliament has equal 
legislative power with the Council under the co-decision procedure, a majority of EU legislation 
is still passed under the consultation procedure, where the Parliament has only a limited power 
of delay.”104 As a result, national governments do not view this institution as an adequate 
representative of their internal interests.
105
  
Another issue that the European Union struggles to solve is to increase the ratio of EU 
citizens participating in elections to the European Parliament. This problem is connected to 
identity difficulties mentioned above. EU citizens’ preferences can influence policy outcomes on 
the supranational level at best only indirectly and therefore they feel too distanced from this kind 
of decision-making. In the case of national elections, citizens are mostly concerned about 
domestic issues that influence their everyday life and that is reflected into the results of voting. 
On the contrary, EU citizens do not consider the European Parliament as an extension of their 
own concerns, what resulted into a very low proportion of voters during the European 
elections.
106
  
Consequently, the European Parliament is not “the dominant institution in EU 
governance, private interest groups do not have to compete with democratic parties’ politics in 
the EU policy-making process”. As a result, a lot of diffused interests lead to pluralist policy 
process on the supranational level.
107
 
 
3.1.3 Value-based Euroscepticism 
 
Another approach for understanding Euroscepticism is to view it from the perspective of values 
and normative issues. As Leconte claims, value-based Euroscepticism “refers to the perception 
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that EU institutions unduly interfere in matters where not only strongly held collective and 
societal preferences, but, more fundamentally, value systems, are at stake”108. In some way, it is 
a reversal of democratic deficit described in the previous paragraphs. While the issue of 
democracy was discussed in the bottom-up course (how are national preferences [not] reflected 
on the supranational level), the value-based approach is viewing Euroscepticism in the way, how 
the EU impacts ‘socially constructed and culturally bound’ issues (from the supranational to 
national level).
109
  
Value-based Euroscepticism mostly arises, when a Member state has the impression that 
the EU is trying to influence a matter, which is out of its competency (e.g. abortion). Three major 
developments within EU law encouraged Eurosceptic stand points from the value angle.
110
 When 
the internal market was completed, important early disputes arose. Upon the agreement about 
free circulation of goods, capital, workers and services, Sweden had in 1997 a state monopoly on 
selling alcohol, which discriminated against foreign licensed importers. Leconte gives another 
example, when in 1991 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that the way the abortion is 
performed in Ireland in conflict with Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Community. After 
that, vehement debates about inappropriate EU interference took place in Ireland.
111
 
Second, the EU was considered to have overstepped its power also in the case of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Most controversial parts were, for instance, non-discrimination 
provisions or those on the right to work. In 2000, the ECJ ruled against Germany due to the 
discrimination of women in the German army, or more precisely their prohibition to participation 
in combat operations. As a result, Germany strongly criticised the EU for crossing the lines of 
competency, because this matter is ‘not purely economic’ and “it is unacceptable that the EU 
takes this decision out of the hands of national organs”112. 
Third, upon entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, national governments began to 
harmonize some of their criminal laws, mutually recognize judicial decisions and an EU public 
prosecutor office should be established. This development is viewed as a start of political union 
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where states are pooling sovereignty in the areas that have been shaped by national history and 
therefore should be preserved as domestic matter. Not surprisingly, the Member states (e.g. 
Czech Republic) feel forced to undertake laws, which would otherwise not adopted.
113
  
 
3.1.4 Cultural anti-Europeanism 
  
The fourth and last form of Euroscepticism is also the most contentious one. It is based 
on partial or complete negation of Europe as such (therefore Leconte adopts the definition ‘anti-
Europeanism’). Followers of this phenomenon do not approve of bringing the people of Europe 
closer together, because they “neither share a common history, nor a political culture”114. Apart 
from the free trade area, Europe as a union does not make sense to them. Another version of anti-
Europeanism is connected to value-based form of scepticism. Since Europe has never carried the 
same norms, values or traditions, the attempt to ‘Europeanize’ countries within the region should 
be rejected. Otherwise it may cause ‘corrosion’ of national values.115 Eurosceptics argue, that 
there are at least ‘two Europes’ referring either to the North and the South, or to the West and the 
East. Subsequently, Leconte comes to the conclusion that the lack of shared history is the reason 
why anti-Europeanism occurs.
116
  
 In the Maastricht period, sceptics expressed their concerns in relation to identity and 
political developments. The creation of EU citizenship is already analyzed in previous 
paragraphs, but judgment of the Maastricht Treaty by the German Constitutional Court in 1993 
triggered new debates, namely in the areas of national constitutions and their possible 
harmonization.
117
 
As a matter of fact, since there is (according to France) no common language, culture, 
religion or history, democracy in Europe cannot be conceived. Therefore ‘nation-state’ is the 
only carrier of democracy based on debate and mutual understanding.
118
 As an example of anti-
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Europeanism Leconte mentions Britain, whose deep “mistrust towards continental European 
countries’ welfare states and institutions”119 creates the strongest opposition towards further 
European integration. 
As this categorization has shown, there are various reasons for Eurosceptic approaches 
that differ across the European countries. The common indicator present in all groups is lack of 
shared history, which could have positively influenced a final vision of the European integration 
in general. What is more, fear of uncontrolled European unification negatively impacts upon 
participating countries and their perception of costs and benefits resulting from the membership. 
As explained above, there are numerous definitions and typologies of Euroscepticism and 
its forms. In this chapter I introduce the three most common classifications among scholars. First 
one is a typology built up by Taggart and Szczerbiak, which is considered to be a fundamental 
categorization. As a counterpart I use Kopecky and Mudde’s theory as a prelude to ultimately 
Conti and Verzichelli’s theory, since this one is built on the previous two as a compromise. 
 
3.2 Taggart and Szczerbiak’s typology 
 
In order to explain Euroscepticism in Western European, as well as in Eastern and 
Central European countries (after they started to run their candidacy to the EU and subsequently 
acquired membership), Taggart and Szczerbiak publish within the European Parties Elections 
and Referendums Network (EPERN) initiative a comprehensive research paper Opposing 
Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation (2000). They 
are the first pioneers who attempt to encompass reasons, types and extent of party-based 
Euroscepticism within Europe.    
In their original version, authors include Taggart´s very first interpretation of the 
phenomenon, which they further break down to two main categories (Hard and Soft 
Euroscepticism), but omit a positive standing point towards the EU. 
The early definition claims that Hard Euroscepticism is “where there is a principal 
opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think 
that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are 
tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently 
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conceived”120. Here it is important to underline two main shortcuts regarding how to observe if 
the party is hard-Eurosceptic or not. According to the authors, if the party is a ‘single-issue anti-
EU party’ (which opposes to the EU from principle), or if the party does not approve the current 
state of European integration (which indicates conditional opposition towards the EU) it means 
these parties are hard Eurosceptics.
121
 
On the contrary, Soft Euroscepticism is “where there is not a principled objection to 
European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy 
areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 
national interest is currently at odds with the EU´s trajectory”122. In other words, the 
Eurosceptical attitude is mostly expressed rhetorically (hard Eurosceptics choose more resolute 
steps such as blocking the Treaty or rejecting to support any kind of integration - present or 
future), thus when a political party partially criticises EU governance or when the party does not 
approve the current development of European integration. A party is considered to be 
Eurosceptic also in the sense of opposing any further integration among Member states, while 
supporting current levels of integration.
123
 
Hard Eurosceptics have tendencies to liken the European Union to previous politically or 
economically combined alliances. As Szczerbiak and Taggart explains, it is usually represented 
by ‘enemies’ from the past - “capitalism for communists, socialism for the right, bureaucracy for 
populists, supranationalism for nationalists, or neoliberalism for socialists”124. For Soft 
Eurosceptics key issues are individual policies, interests or issues that they support. These arise 
from the national interests - e.g. Norway and Iceland involved in the debate about the Common 
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Fisheries Policy, while inland states like Slovakia or Czech Republic have only very little 
interest in it.
125
 
 
3.3 Kopecky and Mudde’s typology 
  
 Even though Kopecky and Mudde criticise to some extent Szczerbiak and Taggart 
typology of Euroscepticism, they build their own suggestions on the two fundamental arguments. 
As Kopecky and Mudde state, their alternative is less comprehensive, but more precise. In their 
distinction is included as opposition, so positive approach towards the EU. 
First of all, they draw the line between principled (‘diffuse’) and conditional (‘specific’) 
support for the European Union. “By diffuse support (the authors) mean support for the general 
ideas of European integration that underlie the EU. By specific support (the authors) denote 
support for the general practice of European integration; that is, the EU as it is and as it is 
developing.”126 
Furthermore, Kopecky and Mudde suggest two main groups for European integration: 
‘Europhiles’ and ‘Europhobes’.  Europhiles view the EU as “institutionalized cooperation on the 
basis of pooled sovereignty” and “liberal market economy” with a goal to create a supranational 
state, which they have in common with federalists. For Europhiles it is characteristic to consider 
the European Union mainly from economic perspective.
127
 
Europhobes on the other hand, “do not support (and often even oppose) the general ideas 
of European integration underlying the EU”.128 They generally reject all attempts to integrate 
Europe into one supranational state. However, this group includes mainly nationalists or 
isolationalists who, to some extent, support other forms of cooperation among European 
countries (e.g. in the declaration “Building a New Europe” in 1999 they call for partnership in 
the sphere of security, peace-making and democracy in Europe). All in all, Europhobes stand for 
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not pooling sovereignty among states, and cooperation is built on voluntary participation, or 
European integration without involvement of their own country.
129
 
Add to this, Kopecky and Mudde provide a second perspective for measurement of 
Euroscepticism, EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. “EU-optimists believe in the EU as it is and as 
it is developing, either because they are satisfied with the way it has been set up and is running, 
or because they are optimistic about the direction of development of the EU”.130 EU-pessimists 
are in disagreement with the current status of European integration or they do not approve the 
direction the EU is developing. Simply said, EU-pessimists are generally not opposing the 
European Union, yet they expected common cooperation among Member states differently as it 
exists now.
131
 
By separating the above-mentioned groups of supporters of the EU, the four-class 
division is created as follows: 
1. Euroenthusiasts - supporters of both the European Union and European integration 
2. Eurosceptics - supporters of European integration, opponents of current European 
   integration trajectory 
3. Eurorejects - opponents of both the European Union and European integration 
4. Europragmatists - supporters of the European Union, opponents of European  
    Integration (more precisely they do not have a particular stand point towards European  
    integration, but for economic reasons they approve their country’s membership in the  
    EU)
132
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Source: Kopecký P., Mudde C.: The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe, 2002 
 
In my opinion, Kopecky and Mudde’s typology is too complicated to be applied to 
national party systems. However, it is very useful in order to introduce (for my case studies) the 
more relevant Conti and Verzichelli version, since it also includes a positive approach towards 
the European Union and it somehow draws a linkage between their thesis and the Hard/Soft 
Euroscepticism definition. Moreover, Czech and Slovak political parties often do not have a 
clear position towards the EU as Kopecky and Mudde expect them to have, so this categorization 
would not be satisfactory.  
 
42 
3.4 Conti and Verzichelli typology 
 
Nicoló Conti published “Party Attitudes to European integration: a longitudinal Analysis 
of the Italian case” (2003), with his hypothesis based on Taggart and Szczerbiak’s findings. 
Conti is more specific about the factors that are crucial for decisions about whether and to what 
extent is political party Eurosceptic or not.
133
 
According to Conti, there are three main factors that influencing party-position within the 
national political system: 
1. political party ideology 
2. “the spatial positioning of a party along the political spectrum in terms of 
    core/periphery” 
3. position of the party within the national political system - whether it is government or 
   opposition party
134
 
Even though Conti´s research is focused on Italy as a case study, its theoretical 
framework became acknowledged by other scholars in further cross-national analysis of party-
based Euroscepticism within the Member states. Conti starts with criticisms towards the lack of 
empirical analysis that would sufficiently explain changes in relations between the Italian 
national government and European Union elites over the time.
135
 
In cooperation with Verzichelli (2003), Conti created a comprehensive table, where it is 
possible to sort party-based approaches towards the EU and European integration across 
European countries. The authors take into account both opposition and consent with the 
European project, so their scale starts with Hard Euroscepticism and ends with Identity 
Europeanism, which is unconditional support for both integration and the Union. Moreover, the 
range includes two Eurosceptic and two Euro-optimistic stances with one neutral centre line in 
order to be able place different kind of political parties across the EU.
136
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Source: Conti L, Verzichelli L.: The European Dimension of Political Discourse in Italy: a Longitudinal Analysis of Party Preferences,  
            2003 
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3.5 Rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory is based on two key assumptions: self-interest and rationality. As 
Hindmoor (2010) claims, “people can be relied upon to act in ways which best secure their goals 
and that these goals reflect their self-interest”137. Moreover, rational choice theory denies any 
kind of spontaneous or uncontrolled behaviour, when a calculative approach based on actors’ 
preferences is the main motivation.
138
 Green and Shapiro (1994) identified principal assumptions 
on which the theory is based. In fact, there is no ‘single rational choice theory’ (because theorists 
are not united in this respect), so they form six key principles that provides angle wide enough to 
cover different spheres (sociology, politics etc.)
139
  
First and foremost, utility maximization is the core of rational choice theory. It is 
necessary to mention, that individuals are not affected by others’ wealth, unless it interferes with 
their own goals’ attainability. Also, the object of utility growth is an ensemble of ambitions, 
rather than only one particular matter.
140
  
Secondly, two main requirements in the terms of consistency are crucial for rational 
choice theorists. ‘Assumption of connectedness’ means, that at least two possible outcomes 
should be available. Then, the agent can choose according to his/her preferences based on 
comparison with the more desired option. Also, these preferences are considered to be transitive 
- “if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then this consistency rule requires that A be 
preferred to C”141. That also shows agent´s values and ambitions.  
‘Maximization of expected value’ is the third rational choice assumption. In other words, 
current utility is not that important as future benefit from agent´s action. Moreover, if the 
probability of achieving one’s desired goal is higher than the other aimed goals, agent adjusts all 
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ambitions and plans and thus designs something like a numerical list of goals based on their 
probability of being achieved.
142
  
Finally, “rational choice theorists generally assume that their models apply equally to all 
persons under study - that decisions, rules, and tastes are stable over time”143 so they are able to 
explain voters’ behaviour. 
Taking rational choice theory from a political perspective, the assumptions are a bit 
different. First of all, politics are significantly connected with economics by comparing costs and 
benefits resulting from agent’s action. Therefore theorists presume that explanations of economic 
model of human behaviour, is relevant also for political phenomena. In other words, preferences 
that individuals possess are ‘given’, which means it does not matter whether they are rational or 
irrational, because “an individual is viewed as trying to accommodate the world to their 
desires”.144 
 What the fields have in common is that utility maximization and assumption of 
connectedness are both included in economic and political sphere of the Rational Choice Theory. 
Parsons (2005) explains these premises with an example of purchasing a car. As in economics, 
the consumer has certain funds to buy a car. Even though he/she desires a luxurious car, the final 
decision is based on his/her budget, therefore theorists assume that these choices are made 
“under conditions of scarcity, where scarce resources are not restricted to money, but also 
include factors such as time and effort”. 145 This is strongly connected to feasibility of desired 
goals, since “actions have outcomes, or consequences, and individuals are viewed as performing 
the action from all available actions whose outcome is the most preferred”, 146 so the main driver 
is again self-interest.  
As for scarcity, individuals have to accept the consequence of their action. If the person 
chooses to go voting instead of working out in gym, as a result it may cause his/her to become 
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overweight but also help to elect his preferred political party in the government. These are called 
‘opportunity costs’, “where the cost of undertaking one course of action is the cost of the next 
available action foregone”.147  
What is different from an economic point of view, however is that researchers in politics 
are concerned with questions that economics might consider irrelevant. How come that 
individual prefers one thing to another? How do they decide to vote for one particular political 
party instead of another? Or how do they decide which party is more likely to achieve its goals 
(common with voter´s ones) in case where various parties hold the same preferences? 
Although the rational choice theorists discuss mostly individuals as actors of action 
(Green and Shapiro consider it as one of the main indicators), Olson (1965) takes into account 
also ‘collective action’, when “a group comprised of self-interested individuals with a common 
interest will attempt to further this common interest”148. Olson also admits that larger groups 
“may well possess certain advantages over small groups” in the terms of strength.149 However, 
none of those contributors mention political parties as potential carriers of action. Strøm was 
very critical towards this approach and published A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political 
Parties (1990) as the reaction. 
As for party behaviour, Strøm identifies three models of party behaviour based on the 
Rational Choice Theory. First model is called ‘vote-seeking Party’. According to the author, 
these parties seek to “maximize their electoral support for the purpose of controlling the 
government”.150 In other words, they do not only try to be elected, they also try to maximize the 
amount of their supporters. As a measure they consider number of seats they won.
151
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Second model, the Office-seeking Party, tries to obtain a major role in political office. As 
Strøm further explains, these parties seek privileged private goods (apart from policy outcomes), 
that are able to obtain only when they form governmental coalitions or political offices.
152
  
Third type is the Policy-seeking Party. As the name indicates, these parties’ goal is to 
significantly influence public policies. Again, the Policy-seeking Parties compose governmental 
coalitions which are made “by parties that are connected, or at least close to each other, in 
policy space”153. To accomplish their goals, they also seek for office-dominant position, so 
sometimes there are uncertainties between second and third model.
154
  
The main critique of the Strøm political parties’ categorization is that all functioning 
political parties should try to maximize their voters’ percentage; therefore all of them are vote-
seekers. Moreover, office-seekers are not the only ones that “willingly forego the benefits of 
holding office”155. As for coalitions, peripheral parties often refuse to join an emerging majority 
alliance, even though their preferences are similar or even identical. Finally, all candidates 
should try to affect the policy outcomes in their favour. Eventually, it should be one of the 
reasons why to establish a political party. “A pure policy-seeking party should not condone, 
much less promote, the institutionalization of corporatism, disaggregated pluralism, or 
referendum democracy” as those contribute to weakening the party in the policy decision-
making.
156
 As a result, the author himself admits that pure vote-seekers, office-seekers or policy-
seekers do not exist and provides the ‘unified model of party behaviour’157 within the Rational 
Choice Theory, where it is possible to “locate any form of party behavior in this three-
dimensional model”:  
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Source: Strom K.: A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties, 1990 
 
 To implement this pattern into reality, Strøm created an imaginary political space where 
he identified all of the three previous party categories. “A pure vote-seeking party would be 
located at point A, a pure office seeker at B, and a pure policy seeker at C. (...) Parties that 
pursue all three objectives fall somewhere in the interior of the triangle”.158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Strøm K.: A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties, 1990 
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 As Strøm handily points out, all parties are going through a certain cycle. First of all, it is 
a campaign where all candidates seek for maximization of their support - the ‘vote-seeking 
period’. Therefore votes are considered to be an instrument for being elected, thus the way how 
to enter the ‘office-seeking’ and ‘policy-seeking’ periods, not a full-fledged category. Here 
Strøm adopts Downsian “model of retrospective voting” (1957), based on Downs’ claim that 
parties “will maintain relatively stable policy positions over time”159 if they fall under the policy- 
or office-seekers category. And because voters search for stability and certainty in their lives, 
these parties are more likely to be successful. Moreover, if political parties match their pre-
electoral programme after being elected, and provides voters with the impression of reliability 
and responsibility, empirical studies shows that these are rewarded with re-election.
160
 For this 
reason parties cannot change their ideology once they have made it public, because voters do not 
want to support unreliable representatives. As a matter of fact, there must be some diversity 
among political parties’ ideologies, because “they must create enough product differentiation to 
make their output distinguishable from that of their rivals”.161 
 
3.6 Hypothesis 
 
In order to explain the Eurosceptic/Euro-optimistic standing point of political parties in 
Slovakia and Czech Republic, I would like to create two-dimensional model, where I can test the 
Strøm’s Triangle Model with Conti and Verzichelli Party-based Euroscepticism typology. 
In simple terms, Leconte identifies four main reasons for Euroscepticism within political 
parties:  
1. fear of loss of sovereignty, dissatisfaction with EU policy outcomes, and     
     weakened democracy in EU institutions – political Euroscepticism 
2. cultural differences – cultural anti-Europeanism  
3. value differences and the EU  interference in national matters – value-based  
     Euroscepticism 
4. additional costs resulting from integration, more expenses than benefits from the  
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     membership – utilitarian Euroscepticism 
Strøm’s three types of political parties’ behaviour can be seen as the reverse side of 
parties’ preferences. As written above, vote-seeking party is composed of members, whose main 
driver is income, prestige or power.
162
 Downs accurately describes this party as the one 
formulating policies “in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate 
policies”163. Moreover, they do not only try to be elected, they try to maximize their support.164 
Office-seekers are usually members of the biggest political parties or party coalitions within 
national system, since they try to maximize the party's influence in the government.  Laver and 
Schofield view their effort as “the desire to control some sort of fixed prize, a prize captured by 
the winning coalition and divided among its members”165. Finally, Policy-seekers form coalitions 
with other parties focused on similar topics, which is contrasted with ‘policy-based coalition 
theory’ that parties are indiscriminate in terms of choosing coalition partners.166 
Conducting analysis of parties’ electoral programmes and manifestos, and other political 
action contributing to the national atmosphere (for example, president´s speech or veto of certain 
EU policy), I can locate individual party on Conti and Verzichelli scale. Conti and Verzichelli’s 
scheme illustrates the extent to which these political parties are reluctant towards the European 
integration or the European Union. Therefore it is possible to identify which type of 
Euroscepticism party follows. Formed map shows the main concerns of Czech Republic and 
Slovakia with regards to the European Union and explain what types of Euroscepticism occur in 
the national system. As a result, it is possible to identify particular differences that distinguish 
these two countries from each other.  
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4 Analysis 
 
Czechoslovakia brought together two nations speaking two different languages, holding 
different traditions and values, and except short period of shared history, also different historical 
background. Political dualism in Czech and Slovak Republic was, apart from communist 
ideology, distinct in every other way.  As a result, the Velvet Divorce took place and even 
though it was pure political decision, voters in the two newly-formed republics showed their 
markedly different preferences already in the first separate elections.
167
 Results showed that in 
Czech Republic it was centre-right Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, 
ODS) led by Václav Klaus who won with 29,73% support168. Slovakia voted for left-wing 
nationalist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS) led 
by Vladimír Mečiar with 30,47% support.169  
Shortly after that, during negotiations about the accession to the European Union, Czech 
and Slovak political parties started to adjust their behaviour by formulating standpoints to issues, 
that arose from this process (e.g. to specific policies, to European integration in general etc.). 
Most of the parties did so after the state representatives submitted the official application for 
admission to the European Union
170
 (Slovakia - June 27th, 1995; Czech Republic - January 17th, 
1996).  
In the chapter that follows, I analyse nature of Euroscepticism in the two countries using 
Leconte´s typology. Also, by analysing governing parties’ position from the Eurosceptic 
perspective (formulated in their manifestos and electoral programmes) and locating them within 
Conti and Verzichelli categorization, I subsequently create an image of national political 
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atmosphere in Slovakia and Czech Republic and explain why there are different types of 
Euroscepticism in these countries. 
 
4.1 Czech Republic and the nature of its Euroscepticism 
 
After split of Czechoslovakia in 1992 (officially took effect on January 1st, 1993), both 
newly formed republics had very specific perception on unitarianism - due to their history with 
the Soviet Union. Czech Republic followed “the Return to Europe” campaign, where the national 
elites expressed their expectations and willingness to be part of the democratic (Western) 
Europe, but as a sovereign state. Czechs considered themselves as a country with “the identity of 
a democratic, civilized, well-educated, and cultured nation”171 and building on their central 
position in the region, also as ”a cross roads of the political, religious and cultural movements of 
the Continent”172.  
With regards to identity, Brodský raises an interesting question - with the Velvet Divorce 
in 1993 and introduction of plural democracy, Czech identity started to transform, but to what? 
Vision of democracy came from authorities, since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia took place 
purely on the political level. Citizens did not have clear vision of national values and integrity, 
considering it was changing significantly in relatively short periods of time. Besides, during the 
communist rule were people shaped not as a community, but as a society of individuals.
173
 To 
better understand the political development in the country, I briefly identify Czech mentality and 
its main features. 
As Brodský explains, neither Czech Republic, nor Slovakia have in their past an 
experience with their own decision-making or optimizing their political and cultural 
environment. Czechs and Slovaks functioned most of their existence under others’ supremacy 
over their territory, so this historical experience transferred into disinterest of citizens in building 
relations with the outside world.
174
 As a result, the European Union is considered to be an 
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attempt for a supranational identity, in which Czechs refuse to participate. Above mentioned fear 
of losing identity and subsequent debate about the European Constitution thus considerably 
polarized Czech political system.
175
 
Secondly, the establishment of democratic Czech Republic is viewed as a great 
achievement, because democracy (particularly in their own state) is something Czechs fought for 
centuries.
176
  
Taking into account historical and political background, it draws specific picture of 
Czech character and mentality. In fact, it explains to some extent critical behaviour of Czech 
political parties during the accession negotiations and first years as the Member state. Standing 
on crossroads, in 1993 Czechs decided to choose a label of the Western European state. By 
setting up the border with Slovakia, they “lost immediate contact with the territory of former 
Soviet Union”177. Moreover, “Czechs began to believe that in terms of the success of 
transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, from communist to 
democratic political arrangement, their country was standing in the front row among the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe”178. This turning point in the terms of identity denoted 
shift in mentality of Czech (unlike Slovakia where concept such as national pride continued not 
to exist). Accordingly, Czech political elites established a new way of perceiving the European 
project characterized by ‘tremendous enthusiasm’ built on national pride and inherent value.179 
Political parties present in first (and also second) Czech government (Civic Democratic 
Party, Social Democratic Party and Christian and Democratic Union Czechoslovak People’s 
Party), who subsequently participated on negotiations during the accession process, formed the 
public opinion in the country significantly. People viewed them as new leaders after the end of 
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the communist rule in the country.
180
 Václav Klaus (ODS), the main figure of post-revolutionary 
democratic vision, was perceived as a right-wing politician following Utilitarian ‘Thatcherite’ 
Euroscepticism. However, Czech public “was happy to have what they saw as a strong, 
competent and confident leader”.181  
 
 
Election results to the Czech National Council (1992) Source: www.volby.cz 
 
After split, Czech government led by Klaus believed “its radical reform policies would 
quickly mark the Czech Republic out as an early candidate for admission to EU”182, but 
preferred to be a member of global organizations (e.g. OECD and NATO) first. Klaus believed in 
the regional cooperation as well, but viewed the European Union “overregulated and 
inefficient”183, what is considered to be the first public Eurosceptic stance in the Czech national 
system after the establishment of new republic. In fact, Czech Republic acquired the status of the 
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most Eurosceptic country among its Eastern European neighbours, when Czech politicians in 
interviews conducted in 1997 referred to the EU as a “necessary evil”.184  
As stated above, then Prime Minister Václav Klaus considered the EU ‘too bureaucratic’ 
and ‘too economically interventionist’ with significant departure from its origin economic goals 
to “unrealistic political ambitions”185. Based on this attitude, the Economist nicknamed Klaus as 
Václav Thatcher during his interview in 1994, when he claimed Civic Democratic Party is not 
Eurosceptic, rather Euro-realistic. Besides, “the only way of European integration is preservation 
of nation state and its preferences”186, by following Thatcherism (“free markets, low tax, a small 
state, independence, individuality, self-determination”187), which considers the optimal form of 
the European Union a zone of free trade, thus pure economic co-operation among the Member 
states.
188
 That is also confirmation for applying Rational Choice Theory to Czech case, since 
self-interest and individual preferences are main indicators. 
Accordingly, Czech Republic standpoint was at the beginning of 90’s quite contradictory. 
Apart from support for the economic alliance, there is an evident Utilitarian Euroscepticism, 
expressed, for example, by strong rejection of common currency. “The euro (...) lacked an 
objective economic basis, as the diverse economies of Europe did not constitute an optimal 
currency zone”.189  
As for Utilitarian Euroscepticism, Leconte explains that introduction of common 
currency means additional cost of integration. Besides, with common currency smaller state 
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could feel economically vulnerable towards bigger states in the Union, which was also case of 
Czech Republic. Klaus alleged that countries in the EU are “ignoring the historical sensitivities 
of Eastern and Central European candidate states, which had always been historically 
dominated by supranational structures imposed by more powerful neighbours”190. Also Kopecký 
and Mudde identified ‘feeling of being treated as an unequal partner’ as one of Czech reasons for 
resentment.
191
 Another evidence of Utilitarian Euroscepticism based on ‘second-class 
membership’ was fear of increases in unemployment, inflation or possible rises in the cost of 
living.
192
 Namely left-wing parties (KSČM) likened the EU membership to leaving the country 
to be economically exploited.
193
 On the other hand, not joining the EU would mean economic 
isolation and blocking Czech export by the Member States, so there is no other option for such a 
state.
194
 That is also the main reason why after submitting the application to the EU and closing 
most of the negotiating chapters, nature of Czech Euroscepticism shifted from Utilitarian to 
Value-based Euroscepticism. Their Soviet experience left behind the fear of losing sovereignty 
and right-wing parties did not agree with “socialism of the Brussels bureaucracy”195. Therefore 
Czech politicians distinguished between ‘integration’ and ‘unification’, while the second 
alternative was unacceptable. It is necessary to mention, that Klaus government underlined 
intergovernmental, rather than supranational co-operation. As an evidence can be viewed chosen 
wording in their Manifesto, where is the Civic Democratic Party linked to ‘an advocacy of Czech 
national interests’, because the EU is aiming to ‘removal of nation state’ or even to an ‘extinction 
of state sovereignty’.196 In general, almost all documents written by Eurosceptic parties started to 
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focus more on sovereignty issue, unequal membership or short-sightedness of European 
integration.  
The Civic Democratic Party expressed their concerns in e.g. National interests in real 
world (2000); Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism (2001); If to the EU, then only with ODS (2003).  
Other Eurosceptic party besides ODS was the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
(Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy - KSČM). Despite it had support between 10-14%, its 
position was only peripheral and was excluded from all coalition discussions. That was caused 
mainly because of minimal coalition potential.
197
 The Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia 
stated in its Basic programme that they want “integrated Europe with equal nations, Europe built 
bottom-up, not Europe for bureaucratic or monopolist interests”198. In addition, they wrote With 
people for people (2002) and For democratic Europe (2003) where the Communist party 
recommended to vote ‘No’ in the forthcoming referendum about the accession to the EU. Among 
the reasons were: unpreparedness of Czech Republic to join the EU, unsatisfactory negotiated 
conditions and unfamiliarity of the European project after introducing new reforms.
199
 Add to 
this, in the middle of the accession negotiations in 1998, the team leader of the Czech negotiating 
team Pavel Telička claimed that “in some matters the European Union considerably narrowed 
down the negotiating platform for us and the conditions were largely pre-defined”.200  
All in all, KSČM built all its documents on the protection of national social and political 
rights against ‘the steering forces of the EU’ underlining their disagreement with the membership 
or the current form of integration.
201
 Therefore on the Conti/Verzichelli scheme is the 
Communist Party considered to be a Hard Eurosceptic party. Even though other authors locate 
ODS on the Conti/Verzichelli scheme within the Functional Europeanism type, I agree with 
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Rovný202 by locating them (with their support for economic alliance but rejection of the common 
currency and vigorous wording in its documents) as Soft Eurosceptics. If taking into 
consideration their policy attitude, they support from the economic perspective only the EU 
based on four freedoms. On the contrary, they are sceptic towards the issues such as tax policy, 
agricultural policy or any further economic integration. Also, foreign policy should be left upon 
nation states, refusing to strengthen competency of the European Parliament or the European 
Commission.
203
  
Surprisingly, other governmental political parties who created a coalition with ODS 
(Social Democratic Party and Christian and Democratic Union Czechoslovak People’s Party) 
during first and second Klaus´ government, did not formulate (or in very small extent) statement 
towards European integration as such. Until 1998, Civic Democrats were the only one who 
expressed their opinion on the EU, considering their ‘Euro-realist’ criticism as a small barrier in 
the way towards the membership, but provided very few explicit political conclusions. Later on, 
with forthcoming referendum and the official accession, their criticism intensified.
204
 
In its electoral programme in 1996, Civic Democrats expressed their understanding that 
Czech Republic would be prosperous and economically stable only when entering the EU - but 
under a condition, that it would be based on intergovernmental dialogues and competences 
would stay in the national ‘hands’.205 By claiming so, the party shifted to the Value-based 
Euroscepticism. Leconte observes this type of Euroscepticism in the countries that disagree with 
the EU interference in the issues that should be according to them decided on the national level. 
Defending national interests and keeping full sovereignty is the main point of the ODS Foreign 
Policy chapter, showing clearly their priorities.
206
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As the Rational Choice theorists explain, agent's behaviour is influenced by evaluating 
costs and benefits from desired action. Moreover, in order to maximize benefits, agent adjusts 
goals and ambitions. In my opinion, as for ODS during the accession negotiations, the 
representatives understood the states’ need for joining the EU, and by their criticism they tried to 
formulate concerns that Czech Republic should try to solve before entering the Union.  
On the contrary, Communists used their foreign policy profile to distinguish themselves 
from the other political parties within the national system. As Havlík and Kaniok claim, KSČM 
was fairly ambiguous in the terms of viewing on European integration. Communist ideology 
supports internationalism, but rejects imperialism or capitalism.
207
 Basic party programme from 
1992 states their refusal to any kind of “Czech dependence on already existing or just emerging 
supranational power”.  Sovereignty and equality of rights are fundamental for functioning on 
international level, and if KSČM would consider European integration as process violating these 
essentials, they would reject any kind of union. Otherwise, other matters in their Party 
Programme are very vague and not specified in detail.
208
 The Communist Party asserts Leconte´s 
Value-based Euroscepticism, based on fear of losing sovereignty, national values and newly 
constructed identity.
209
    
 Even though the other parties holding important position in the Czech government are 
pro-European, public support for EU membership “has been merely around 50% in the long 
run”.210 
The Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) belongs to Identity Europeanists, since it acts “as a 
“consistent“ pro-European agent emphasizing the necessity of quick integration into the EU 
while it claimed that it will be possible to deal with some issues more effectively only as a EU 
member”. Together with the two Coalition parties, the Christian and Democratic Union – 
Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) and the Freedom Union – Democratic Union (US-
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DEU), they form pro-European faction. Although, the two last mentioned are considered to be 
Functional Europeanists and a linkage between sceptical ODS and supportive ČSSD.211  
 Taking into account the election results from 2002, Hard Eurosceptic KSČM experienced 
a significant rise in power at the expense of both ODS and ČSSD. 
 
 
Election results to the Czech Chamber of Deputies (2002). Source: www.volby.cz 
 
Even though this result could be explained by more Eurosceptic voters, it is necessary to point 
out, that none of Czech political parties led their pre-electoral campaigns based on the anti-
European position. Therefore it is hard to conclude, if the voters felt sympathy with Eurosceptic 
position or just the basic Communist ideology of social equality and advocacy of national 
interests. Besides, after successful referendum, where Czech voters approved the decision to 
enter the EU, KSČM adjusted its electoral programme to the European Parliament “With you for 
you” (2004). In the document, they evaluate “economic stagnation, retreat from democratic 
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principles, formation of antisocial policy as a result of neoliberal approach”212, which they 
ascribed to the unsatisfactory conditions, negotiated for Czech Republic during the accession 
process. As the Rational Theory explains, the agent tries to accommodate the world according to 
its desire. Accordingly, the Communists attempted to persuade voters that even though they 
accepted the Czech Republic accession to the EU, the ideology they stand for would help the EU 
benefit more than by following neo-liberalism. After being elected to the European Parliament 
with support of 20,26%, the major criticism was focused on unequal membership of Czech 
Republic in the EU, when the state “succumbs passively to the EU authorities”213.  
 In my opinion, after success experienced in national elections and subsequent success in 
the EP elections, it could be concluded that certain part of voters agree with KSČM and its Hard 
Euroscepticism. Moreover, numbers of voters are not negligible, which means wider support as 
peripheral parties usually attain. As an evidence is also above mentioned 50% public support for 
the EU, which means that Czech voters are influenced by the two Eurosceptic parties in their 
government ( in comparison with Slovakia where there is no Hard Eurosceptic party in 
government and public polls show around 90% support). Add to this, Václav Klaus was elected 
president in 2003-2013 period. Moreover, the Civic Democratic Party won the elections in 2006 
and became the governing party. In its pre-electoral programme, where the main point is that 
“EU has to stay an open structure”214, the party expressed similar goals as during the accession 
process, which supports the Rational Choice theorists that preferences are given and not 
changing over time, rather adjusting to new situation. ODS added to their goals advocacy of non-
discriminating laws for equal membership of the smaller countries, retention of tax, fiscal and 
social systems in the national competencies, but mostly no further pooling sovereignty.
215
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To make a conclusion, the nature of Czech Euroscepticism has deep roots in the identity 
issue and past, where democracy played only minor role. As I explained, sovereignty and 
national values are the most important requisites for the nation state and Czech Republic is not 
willing to tighten their competency and adopt the European values instead. In Czech case, it is 
important to maintain intergovernmental dialogue based on democracy and equality. Czech 
Republic is very idiomatic state with strong preferences and certain expectations from the EU, 
which are in some areas contradictory (taxation, agriculture etc.) This subchapter explained the 
main concerns of Czech Republic during the negotiation process and why they occurred. Also,  I 
very shortly pointed out the strength of Eurosceptic parties in the national government, which 
mirrored into the lowest public support for the European Union among the Central and Eastern 
European States. As a result, Czech Republic was one of the states that rejected the European 
Constitution, and the last country to sign the Lisbon Treaty after the Czech Constitutional Court 
claimed its harmony with the Czech Constitution. It is worth of further research to describe all 
demonstrations of Czech Euroscepticism and track it until present. I tried to give an explanation, 
why it occurred in Czech Republic in first place and what drove its Euroscepticism during the 
negotiation process. 
 
4.2 Slovak Republic and its Euro-optimism 
Slovak Republic was considered to be the least Eurosceptic Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) country since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Already in 1993, Slovakia signed the 
European Union Association Agreement, where they committed to “political partnership, trade 
liberalization and cooperation in economic, financial and cultural sphere”.216 However, in 1994 
political atmosphere in the country dramatically changed with the election of Mečiar 
government. Ironically, it was Mečiar who 27th June 1995 officially applied Slovakia to be the 
EU Member state. 
Henderson (2005) identifies that all three Mečiar governments (1994-1998) were 
characterized by paradoxes and contradictory behaviour of political elites towards the EU. First 
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of all, membership in the European Union was at the top of the Movement for Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS, led by Mečiar) electoral programme.  Despite the fact that HZDS was elected 
in 1994, Slovakia “formally applied to join the EU six months later, and yet refused steadfastly 
to moderate its domestic political programme in a way that would make Slovakia a credible 
candidate for either EU or NATO membership”. As a result, the state was excluded from the first 
round negotiations in 1997 as the only CEE country who “failed to fulfil democratic criteria”.217  
Second paradox was “the rapid transformation of Slovakia” that took place at the turn of 
millennium. As Henderson explains, while in 1990´s Slovakia belonged to countries which were 
not reliable and politically unstable, in 2005 it already hosted the Bush-Putin summit as a 
respectable and solid partner.
218
  
With regards to public opinion, polls and referendum show that Slovakia is considered to 
be the biggest supporter of the EU regarding the Visegrad group (Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland). The EU accession referendum conducted in Slovakia in 2003, 97,3% of 
people supported the EU membership. On the other hand, subsequent EU Parliament election in 
2004 was attended only by 17% of Slovak voters (strongest support contrasting with lowest 
electoral participation in the V4 Group
219
). Moreover, the participating voters elected MEPs only 
from the five largest parliamentary parties.
220
 The third paradox addresses the problem with 
Slovak political elites. As Leconte claims, when people are not satisfied with functioning of their 
national political system, they raise their expectations towards the supranational level. “The 
stronger the satisfaction with national institutions, the more likely that perceptions of a 
‘democratic deficit’ at EU level will diminish support for further integration”.221 As Slovakia 
was criticised for democratic deficit and was ruled for quite a long period by one party (HZDS), 
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people´s disapproval transformed into anticipation that the EU can have positive impact on 
national politics.
222
 
To make a brief conclusion, Slovakia strongly supported the accession to the EU, but 
confirmed their hesitation about the EU institutions in the European Parliament elections, since 
these were filled with members of the largest Slovak political parties. As Slovak citizens felt 
unsatisfied with performance of Slovak political elites, their continued to show their 
dissatisfaction also on supranational level by rejecting to vote for the same state representatives.  
However, it is also important to underline the fact that Slovak people were not well-
informed with regards to the EU, due to weak EU campaigns and confusion caused by HZDS 
(support of the EU membership, but behaviour causing the failure of the Slovak accession 
negotiations).
223
 
As for specific political parties, the one that influenced the accession process the most 
was the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS). As I 
stated before, the Movement together with the Civic Democratic Party in Czech Republic were 
the governing parties during the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, and therefore vital power over 
this political decision. In 1994 in special elections, HZDS was elected again with a clear 
prevalence.
224
 The Movement focused on nation building, taking foreign policy as a secondary 
issue. Mečiar’s rhetoric was often in conflict with European integration principles, and the 
Movement ignored all diplomatic protests raised by foreign politicians. After the second EU 
demarche in 1995, Mečiar stated that “it was not a demarche, it was just a release (...) We 
[Slovakia] are extremely important and crucial for the EU from a geopolitical perspective. If 
somebody says we will or we will not be accepted, do not worry about it, they need us”.225 That 
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was also the reason of democratic failure and subsequent rejection of Slovak application to the 
EU. 
226
 After the Commission published in 1997 their recommendation not to accept Slovakia as 
a Member state, HZDS claimed that “we are a sovereign state and nobody can give us 
ultimatums, even less a group of the European Parliament politicians, who do not have decision-
making power”227.  
In comparison with Czech Republic, Slovakia was completely different case. While 
Czech Republic was taking the EU membership for granted as something that will inevitably 
happen and thus was very clear about its expectations and concerns, Slovakia was to a large 
extent dependant on Mečiar’s decisions. This brave implication can be supported by the fact that 
especially before 1998 elections, HZDS members stopped to discuss foreign policy at all, 
keeping the citizens uninformed about current development. Also, their pre-electoral programme 
did not include the foreign policy chapter. Citizens were poorly informed, which could be seen 
as an attempt to encourage low participation on the EU referendum. However, their official 
recommendation incited people to say ‘Yes’ to the European Union.228 
Electoral results to the National Council of the Slovak Republic (1998) Source: Statistical Office of Slovak Republic 
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It is very important to keep in mind very strong position that HZDS hold since the 
dissolution (see the table above). Even though they won also in 1998 elections, their ‘zero 
coalition potential’ caused their inability to set up the government.229 This could be seen as a 
turning point of Henderson’s second paradox, when HZDS became an opposition party and 
Slovak rapid transformation has begun. Slovak Democratic Coalition (Slovenská demokratická 
koalícia, SDK), strong supporter of the EU and also ‘cross-border co-operation’ in general, 
ended up second in elections with 26,3% supporters. As one of their main pre-electoral 
commitments was the EU and NATO membership. Namely these two international organizations 
expressed concerns that if HZDS (namely Mečiar) is to be elected again, Slovakia would not be 
accepted as a member. As SDK established the government and was the main coalition party, 
Slovakia fastened the EU negotiations in order to reach Czech Republic (and other states 
expected to enter the Union in 2004).
230
 New Prime Minister, Mikuláš Dzurinda, restored and re-
opened negotiation process in 2000, already in 2001 Slovakia reached Czech Republic in the 
number of closed chapters, and in 2002 the Commission officially recommended Slovak 
Republic to be the part of 2004 enlargement.
231
 
 
Electoral results to the National Council of the Slovak Republic (1998) Source: Statistical Office of Slovak Republic 
Despite the fact, that HZDS was the reason why Slovakia was excluded from the first 
round negotiations in the EU accession process, I identify HZDS as Soft Eurosceptic party on 
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Conti and Verzichelli’s scheme. In party documents, pre-electoral programmes and pre-
referendum recommendation the Movement clearly support the EU membership. The democratic 
deficit based on Mečiar’s unrivalled position, protests raised by EU politicians against the laws 
that HZDS passed (e.g. Anti-coalition law) and exclusion from the accession process in mid-90s 
confirm the Eurosceptic stance. As for Leconte´s typology, HZDS stands for Political 
Euroscepticism, when the party is not willing to weaken their position at the expense of 
supranational governance. 
The transformation of Slovakia basically happened during 1998-2004 period, when more 
political parties emerged (SMER, SDKÚ, ANO) and brought more diversity onto political scene. 
This period was characteristic by bad democratic situation, negative trends in terms of security, 
employment and law adherence. The Institute for Public Matters conducted in 1997 survey 
among Slovak people with a result of staggering 80% people who admitted that Slovak citizens 
have no impact on the national political affairs.
232
 This could be considered as another proof of 
people´s dissatisfaction with political elites. Within this period (1998-2004), Slovak Euro-
optimism reached the highest levels among the Visegrad Group (92%)
233
. As analysed in the 
previous chapter, Czech Republic was at that time struggling with Value-based Euroscepticism, 
when the state viewed the EU as a grounds for corrosion of their national values. Slovak people 
on the other hand wanted to find out what their national values are.  
Emergence of new political party, the Direction (SMER), meant another party without 
ideological definition. Its leader, Robert Fico, referred to the party as rational and pragmatic, 
however media used term populist. What they had in common with HZDS was the fact that 
entire party depended on its leader.
234
 That meant two politicians with an ambition to lead the 
nation. Not surprisingly, Fico have often had disputes with Mečiar as both considered themselves 
as national rulers. “It is very dangerous to meet with Mečiar, since he interprets his meetings 
very differently.” (Robert Fico, 2001) Later in 2002, Fico accused Mečiar of not following the 
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national interests in order to look better into the eyes of the EU and NATO (as an attempt to 
remedy his already dubious reputation)
235
. Mečiar underlined his patriotism by the claim that he 
was instrumental in the democracy-building, while Fico “was just afraid how it is going to end 
up”.236  
SMER (led by Fico) stands for euro-realistic approach towards the EU as do the Civic 
Democrats in Czech Republic. In other words, Fico expressed their desire for Slovakia to be the 
Member State, but it is also necessary to inform the citizens about ‘the potential negative impact’ 
that the EU could possibly have on their everyday life. Also, SMER criticised former 
governments for disadvantageous conditions negotiated in the agriculture and energetic 
spheres.
237
 That could be viewed as signs of Political Euroscepticism, since Leconte identified 
dissatisfaction with negotiation process as one of its features.  Besides, SMER in their official 
party programme supports European integration, which is according to them vital interest for the 
Slovak Republic. However, the party conditioned it by ‘mutually beneficial membership with 
respect to state sovereignty and principal of equality’.238 It is almost the same wording as in the 
Klaus’ Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism (ODS) published in the Czech Republic in 2001.  
Even though SMER showed ambiguous attitudes towards the EU, they directly supported 
the EU in referendum and elections to the European Parliament. Also, they published Stronger 
Slovakia in social Europe (2004), which makes them Functional Europeanists on the Conti and 
Verzichelli scheme. It means that although they have some objections, in general is SMER pro-
European and advocates Slovak national interests on the supranational level.  
To make a brief comparison of Slovak and Czech Communist parties, as analysed before, 
Czech KSČM hold relatively strong position with successful re-election ever since the 
dissolution. Anyhow, Slovak KSS (Komunistická strana Slovenska) have not managed to get 
more than 3% support until 2002, when they surprisingly got elected with 6,3% support. KSS 
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continues to be anti-capitalistic with strong criticism against every government elected from 
1993 onwards, blaming them for a decay of political and economic area. 
239
 
As for their pre-electoral programme, the party uses watchwords like ‘equal accession 
into integration processes’, ‘co-operation with left-wing political parties around the world’ and 
‘rejection of regulated market’.240 Even though the party is not overtly against European 
integration, it has support from the most of the anti-European voters in Slovakia. Therefore KSS 
does not define their stand point on the issue and addresses their concerns very carefully.
241
 I 
locate KSS in Strong Euroscepticism, because despite their willingness to enter the EU, among 
their conditions are principles colliding with the EU ones. 
 
Conclusion 
While comparing Czech Euroscepticism and Slovak Euro-optimism, reasons for the 
contradictory approaches towards the EU became more clear and understandable. Each country 
experienced different impressions from the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Czech Republic lost 
the direct connection with the former Soviet Union, Slovakia was afraid of being isolated. While 
Czech Republic felt like coming back to Western and Central Europe, Slovakia was aware of the 
fact that all the prosperous industry stayed in Czech Republic.  
Add to this, each country experienced different political development and shaping of the 
EU approaches was influenced by diverse actors. Czech Republic successfully introduced plural 
democracy with rapid transition to market economy. Slovakia stayed ‘jeopardized’ in one-party 
governance, where actually three ideologically similar parties (HZDS-SNS-ZRS) hold influential 
position over decision-making. 
Not only were both countries characteristic by contradictory approaches towards the EU, 
but also their reasons and development differed. After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, bigger 
and economically more stable Czech Republic wanted to benefit from their advantageous 
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geographical position. Slovakia, often referred to as ‘poorer relative’, tried to restore its economy 
and fulfil the industrial hole, which emerged after the dissolution.  
Focusing on Czech Republic, Euroscepticism changed from Utilitarian to Value-based 
Euroscepticism. At first, political elites doubted the benefits resulting from the EU membership, 
focusing more on the national situation and its restoration. As a reason for Utilitarian 
Euroscepticism they stated that common economic sphere within the EU Member states is not 
sufficiently working. Subsequently, strong ODS (Civic Democrats) lobby secured a delay with 
regards to adoption of the common currency. As a result, Czech Republic decided not to 
introduce Euro (unlike Slovakia in 2009).  
Utility became an important issue for Czech economy. As a matter of fact, country in 
transition to plural democracy viewed the EU membership as a reason for additional integration 
costs. When the accession process reached the second half and Czech membership became 
clearer and more certain, Czech Euroscepticism shifted from Utilitarian to Value-based. Again, 
Czech political leader Vaclav Klaus, strongly opposing the EU in the current development, 
contributed to the scepticism in the country by warning citizens that the EU is pushing through 
their own interest and country would stop being sovereign anymore. Also, it could cause a 
corrosion of national values, taking over foreign culture and habits coming from the EU. 
In Slovakia, Political Euroscepticism could be seen among few parties, but in general 
Euro-optimistic attitude prevailed. In fact, Slovakia felt ‘Utilitarian Euro-optimism’, when fear 
of being isolated and ‘left unnoticed’ boost the optimistic attitude towards the EU. Slovak 
Republic expected more benefits from being a member as being out. Also, need for restoration of 
the economy forced the country to look for new investors and trade partners.  
 With regards to Value-based Euroscepticism that emerged in Czech Republic, in 
Slovakia this type of scepticism did not occur. As a reason could be viewed the lack of 
‘community’ feeling. Add to this, Czech Republic is double as big as Slovakia, with stronger 
culture that to some extent transferred also to Slovakia. After the dissolution, Slovaks did not 
feel as it was their own culture, so the need for culture-identification emerged as well. 
To make a summary, I managed to identify reasons for Czech Euroscepticism, its reasons 
as well as demonstration. Moreover, I analyzed the two specific types of the phenomenon in 
71 
Czech Republic and supported it with electoral programmes, speeches and other documents 
targeted to the voters. Slovakia proved to be the opposite case with the biggest support for the 
EU membership. Their optimism is resulting from difficult political situation in 1990’s and 
exclusion from the first round negotiations to the EU. After all the concessions that Slovakia 
underwent during the negotiation process (integration costs, transition to plural democracy and 
market economy within 10 years), Slovak citizens and political elites viewed it as they deserve to 
be the part of the Union.  
I encourage additional analysis of further development of Euroscepticism/Euro-optimism 
in these two neighbouring countries. After both countries were admitted to the EU in 2004, and 
also after the EU crisis erupted in 2008, new types and reasons for Euroscepticism emerged. I 
consider it an extensive sphere for further research with new challenges and questions to answer. 
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